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THE MYTH OF MENTAL DISORDER:
TRANSSUBSTANTIVE BEHAVIOR AND TAXOMETRIC
PSYCHIATRY
Steven K. Erickson*

INTRODUCTION
In 1961, psychiatrist Thomas Szasz wrote what would become one
of the most controversial books in psychiatry that directly questioned
whether traditional concepts of mental illnesses existed. The Myth of
Mental Illness1 claimed that while psychiatry openly held mental
illnesses as diseases under the rubric of the medical model,2 they really
were mere arbitrary descriptions of behaviors that the profession itself
had proclaimed to be illnesses. Szasz argued that since there were no
identified lesions in the brain that could be attributed to mental illnesses,
there was no evidence of disease.3 Without disease, mental disorders
were not illnesses as traditionally understood in medicine.4
Consequently, mental illnesses were theoretical formulations describing
behaviors that were declared by the profession as abnormal rather than
* MIRECC Fellow, Yale University; Adjunct Professor of Psychiatry, University of Rochester
Medical Center. J.D., (SUNY Buffalo, Buffalo, NY). L.L.M., (Harvard Law School, Cambridge,
MA). Ph.D., (SUNY Buffalo, Buffalo, NY). This paper was prepared for the Yale University
School of Medicine, Department of Psychiatry. Special thanks to Bill Stuntz, Michael Perlin, Chuck
Ewing, Jeff Rachlinski, Christopher Slobogin Steve Lamberti, Michelle Erickson and Patricia
Erickson for comments and thoughtful discussions.
1. THOMAS S. SZASZ, THE MYTH OF MENTAL ILLNESS: FOUNDATIONS OF A THEORY OF
PERSONAL CONDUCT (1961).
2. Generally, the medical model holds these tenets: (1) sufficient deviation from the normal
results in disease; (2) disease is due to known or unknown natural causes; (3) elimination of these
causes will result in a cue or improvement for the patient. See, George L. Engel, The Need for a
New Medical Model: A Challenge for Biomedicine, 196 SCI. 129 (1977) (describing the traditional
medical model and calling for a new model that would become known as the biopsychosocial
model).
3. SZASZ, supra note 1, at 72. Szasz argues that the absence of mental illnesses in anatomy,
biochemistry, and physiology textbooks suggests that they are not of biological origin.
4. Id.
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based upon any empirically discovered finding.5 As such, mental
illnesses, according to Szasz, were inherently, culturally, and socially
bound and open to manipulation by the dominant social class.6 Thus, the
professional formulations of mental illnesses were inherently a form of
social control whereby society classified as mentally ill those with
socially undesirable behavior. As Szasz famously put it, “[i]f you talk to
God, society calls it praying; if God talks to you, society calls you
schizophrenic.”7
Of course, Szasz’s claim was made at a time when there was much
social change occurring in America and elsewhere. The 1960s was a
time when many questioned long held political and social values,
especially values that reinforced authority figures.8 What was once
considered immutable social tradition was placed on its head. Many
argued that social norms really were methods of social control that
benefited the upper-class.9
Simultaneously, the monolithic state
institutions that once held (often for life) hundreds of thousands of
mentally ill citizens were a dying epoch as the deinstitutionalization
movement led to community treatment as the predominate paradigm of
psychiatric care.10 Coinciding with the civil rights movement, the
migration of the mentally ill from state institutions to the community
followed the emergent belief that individual autonomy was a
fundamental right, and hence a Constitutional one, and should be
zealously guarded among society’s disenfranchised: the poor, ethnic
minorities, and the mentally ill.11

5. For a great review of Szasz’s arguments, see Eric J. Dammann, "The Myth of Mental
Illness:" Continuing Controversies and Their Implications for Mental Health Professionals, 17
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REV. 733, 734-37 (1997).
6. SZASZ, supra note 1, at 72.
7. THOMAS S. SZASZ, THE SECOND SIN 113 (1973).
8. See DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL 75-94 (2001) (describing the shifting
social and political climate in the United Kingdom and United States on penal philosophy during the
late 20th century).
9. For an interesting empirical analysis of social class, protest, and the 1960s see Darren E.
Sherkat & T. Jean Blocker, The Political Development of Sixties’ Activists: Identifying the Influence
of Class, Gender, and Socialization on Protest Participation, 72 SOC. FORCES 821 (1994).
10. See E. FULLER TORREY, OUT OF THE SHADOWS: CONFRONTING AMERICA'S MENTAL
ILLNESS CRISIS 8-11, 91-140 (1997).
11. Probably the most noted case that established personal autonomy (related to reproductive
rights) as a "penumbra" of the Constitution is the Griswold case. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 483 (1965). See also O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (holding that the state
cannot confine a nondangerous mentally ill person against their will); Rogers M. Smith, The
Constitution and Autonomy, 60 TEX. L. REV. 175, 175-84 (1982) (reviewing the numerous Supreme
Court decisions of the 1960s and 1970s that recognized a wide variety of Constitutional rights based
on autonomy); KANT PATEL & MARK E. RUSHEFESKY, HEALTH CARE POLICY IN AN AGE OF NEW
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Putting aside Szasz’s pronouncements, the reality of
deinstitutionalization actually entailed the serendipitous discovery of
effective medications in the 1950s that made community living possible
for the mentally ill rather than any recognition of individual autonomy
by society. Treatment, not acknowledged autonomy, was largely
responsible for the transformation of crazy behavior into mere odd
conduct that could be tolerated by society at large.12 And like so many
social movements, other forces were in play that likely did more to
hasten the exodus of the mentally ill from the state institutions. The
1960s saw the creation of Medicaid which specifically excluded
payments to psychiatric patients in state institutions.13 Along with the
enactment of the Community Mental Health Centers Act14 in 1963,
which provided federal funding for community mental health treatment,
the financial carrot was set by the government to end costly institutional
care for the mentally ill. As one noted psychiatrist put it, the stage was
set for an unholy alliance between the political left who favored civil
liberties and the political right who desired fiscal austerity that was to
become the end of large-scale intuitional care irrespective of other
concerns.15
As the years progressed, it became obvious that the Pollyannaish
hope that all of the institutionalized mentally ill could reintegrate back
into society once the shackles of political oppression and psychiatric
paternalism were thrown off was overly optimistic.16 As many
TECHNOLOGIES 41 (2002) (discussing the influence of women’s, civil, and ethnic minorities’ rights
movements during the 1960s on subsequent health law policy).
12. See William Gronfein, Psychotropic Drugs and the Origins of Deinstitutionalization, 32
SOC. PROBS. 437 (1985). Although Gronfein concludes that psychotropic drugs did not have a
direct influence on discharge rates from state hospitals from the 1940s to 1980s, he also concludes
that medications made deinstitutionalization politically and publicly viable; but see ANDREW
SCULL, SOCIAL ORDER/MENTAL DISORDER (1989) for an argument that medications did have a
direct effect on deinstitutionalization.
13. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a) (2004). The exclusion applies to inpatient psychiatric care for
people aged 21-65. See Susan M. Jennen, The IMD Exclusion: A Discriminatory Denial of Medicaid
Funding for Non-Elderly Adults in Institutions for Mental Disorders, 17 WILLIAM MITCHELL L.
REV. 339, 340-49 (1991) (explaining the history of the inpatient psychiatric care exclusion despite
a lack of a regulatory definition of “Institutions of Mental Diseases” (IMD) contained in 42
U.S.C.A. §1396 until 1988). The exclusion has survived Constitutional challenge. See Kantrowitz
v. Weinberger, 430 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (holding that the IMD exclusion does not violate
federal constitutional rights of due process or equal protection).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 2688 (1963), superseded by Pub. L. No. 94-63 § 66 (1975), and codified by
42 U.S.C. § 246.
15. Interview with J. Richard Ciccone, Director of the Psychiatry and Law Program,
University of Rochester, in Rochester, N.Y. (Mar. 30, 2006).
16. See Nancy K. Rhoden, The Limits of Liberty: Deinstitutionalization, Homelessness, and
Libertarian Theory, 31 EMORY L.J. 375, 377 (1982) ("[D]einstitutionalization harbored an idealized
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advocates and mental health professionals proclaimed, there was the
stark reality of the “obviously mentally ill” person who fervently
believed his food was poisoned, his doctors guilty of implanting
electronic probes in his genitals, and himself to be Jesus Christ despite
the best intentions of community treatment.17 The growing number of
the “obviously mentally ill” persons roaming the streets, often homeless,
preoccupied with intruding thoughts of persecution and bizarre notions
of grandiosity (that even the most sympathetic libertarian found
unfathomable) mitigated against any purest Szaszian position.18
Nevertheless, Szasz was onto something. If mental illnesses do indeed
lack physical markers that can be observed in the laboratory (as we will
see some do and some do not), then they are not discovered in an
empirical sense but proclaimed (or invented as Szasz held) by
established authorities.19 Then the questions naturally flow: Who
decides what is a mental illness? How is mental illness defined? How is
one person determined to be mentally ill while others are not? What
Szasz’s thesis acknowledged was that “mental illness” had evolved over
time and has been influenced as much by social and political factors as
by science.20 As such, psychiatry’s decree that mental illnesses were
illnesses on par with cancer or heart disease was faulty at best and a
fraud at worst.
Despite these concerns, the law has long recognized the existence
and importance of mental illness.21 Blackstone held that prosecution of
notion of ‘community’ and tended to exaggerate the extent to which labeling a person mentally ill
produces and perpetuates pathology. Consequently, they were overly optimistic in their assessment
of the ability of released patients to survive, unaided, in society.”); Alexander Gralnick, Build a
Better State Hospital: Deinstitutionalization Has Failed, 36 HOSP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 738
(1985).
17. See Darold A. Treffert, The Obviously Ill Patient in Need of Treatment: A Fourth
Standard for Civil Commitment, 36 HOSP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 259 (1985).
18. See generally Rhoden, supra note 16, at 386-93; but see Michael L. Perlin, Competency,
Deinstitutionalization, and Homelessness: A Story of Marginalization, 28 HOUS. L. REV. 63 (1991)
(arguing that homelessness among persons with mental illness was more related to housing and
economic factors than untreated illness).
19. See SZASZ, supra note 1, at 12; Drammann, supra note 5, at 734-37. Drammann explains
that Szasz’s contention was that while science proved and discovered phenomena, psychiatry
invented and declared behaviors as illnesses.
20. See Thomas S. Szasz, The Classification of "Mental Illness": A Situational Analysis of
Psychiatric Operations, 33 PSYCHIATRIC Q. 77 (1959) (arguing that social and cultural systems
invariably impact the development of psychiatric nosology).
21. See Derek Bolton, Problems in the Definition of 'Mental Disorder', 51 THE PHIL. Q. 182,
182-83 (2001) (discussing Locke’s conception of mental illness); Nigel Walker, The Insanity
Defense Before 1800, 477 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 25, 25-26 (1985) (stating that the
insanity defense dates back at least to the pre-Norman conquest of 1066 days); see generally ISSAC
RAY, A TREATISE ON THE MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE OF INSANITY (1871).
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a “madman” was morally reprehensible since punishment was only just
when the recipient of the punishment knew why he was being
punished.22 Modern history shows that the law has rarely doubted the
existence of mental illness, of madmen, but has struggled with its
definition and its disposition.23 Thus, law and science both have a
historical appreciation of madness, yet each understanding is rooted
within its own epistemological history. Law is a discipline of the
humanities, based upon beliefs, arguments, and deduction. Truth, in
law, is derived not so much by production of observable phenomenon,
but by persuasion and argument. On the other hand, modern psychiatry
posits itself as a natural science, based in empiricism, observation, and
experimentation. Science pursues truth by investing in verifiable
theories that through consensus become established laws that explain
material phenomenon. Yet this transformation is fairly recent, and old
habits die hard.
Psychiatry’s growth from mainly treating
institutionalized citizens to its psychoanalytical heyday of the 1950s
22. William Blackstone, Of the Persons Capable of Committing Crimes, in 4 COMMENTARIES
2 (1769) (discussing the historical view of furious furore solum punitur (“madness alone punishes a
madman”) and that madness as a deficiency of the will should stay the criminal prosecution at any
time during a criminal proceeding, including the carrying out of execution). Most scholars look to
the Rex case for establishing the wild beast test. Rex v. Arnold, 16 How. St. Tr. 695, 764-65 (1724)
(“If a man be deprived of his reason, and consequently, his intention, he cannot be guilty . . . [he]
does not know what he is doing, no more than an infant, than a brute, or a wild beast.”). Yet some
have argued that the wild beast test was never validly articulated. See Ira Mickenberg, A Pleasant
Surprise: The Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdict Has Both Succeeded In Its Own Right and Successfully
Preserved the Traditional Role of the Insanity Defense, 55 U. CIN. L. REV. 943, 996 n.3 (1987) (“It
has been persuasively argued, however, that the phrase ‘wild beast,’ as employed in Arnold and
other eighteenth century British cases is merely illustrative, and was never meant to establish a
specific test for the determination of legal insanity.”). Indeed, the Supreme Court recently affirmed
this position in Clark v. Arizona, 126 S. Ct. 2709 (2006), by upholding Arizona’s insanity statute
which jettisoned the cognition prong in favor of a sole moral prong. Cf. William J. Stuntz, The
Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV. 780 (2006) (noting that within the
past thirty years the courts have mostly ruled in criminal constitutional matters relating to
procedural and not substantive issues). Notwithstanding, mental sanity has been an enduring feature
of American criminal law. See People v. Tortorici, 92 N.Y.2d 757, 773-74 (N.Y. 1999) (Smith, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 834 (1999) (discussing the sua sponte responsibility of the courts
in mental competency matters as a fundamental component of American criminal law: “[a]kin to
every criminal defendant's unilateral rights to decide whether to proceed without the benefit of
counsel, whether to enter a plea of guilty to the charge(s) or whether to offer his or her testimony at
trial, the fundamental right of the accused to be mentally competent at trial is a right which is
individually owned and unilaterally exercised by every criminal defendant, independent of any
action by trial counsel.”); Thus, mental sanity can be seen as important in a procedural sense as in
the competency issues and substantive as seen in the various mens rea components and the insanity
defense.
23. See Lee S. Weinberg & Richard E. Vatz, The Insanity Plea: Szaszian Ethics and
Epistemology, 3 THEORETICAL MED. & BIOETHICS 1573, 424-30 (1982) (discussing the history of
the insanity defense); Bolton, supra note 21; Walker, supra note 21.
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marked an impressive expansion of its influence in popular culture, law,
and morality. Whereas in its early years, psychiatry was rooted in a
simplistic biological model of mental disease, Sigmund Freud brought
modern psychiatry out to the masses. Neuroses, ego, unconscious
motivations – these ideas of Freudian psychoanalytical drives were not
merely a new model of behavior. Rather, these revolutionary concepts
provided psychiatry the power to opine with ostensible scientific
authority about all behaviors. The origins, motivations, implications of
any behavior were now within the purview of psychiatric expertise and
judgment. This led to an exponential growth in the number and type of
behaviors that were declared by the profession as indicative of mental
pathology, and hence, open to psychiatric interpretation.
The consequence of this effect is that our current popular and
scholarly thinking is replete with notions that all behaviors can be
explained through science. Discussions about behavior and science
inevitably lead to claims that behavior is caused by something other than
free will and choice.24 Since modern psychiatry has become the
authority on all behaviors – even those beyond the manifestation of
disease – the pull is to classify all illegal or antisocial behavior as
indicative of some type of biological abnormality irrespective of the
scientific weight supporting such claims. Thus, an insidious mindset has
taken hold in our academic and popular thinking whereby all undesirable
conduct is deemed caused by a sick mind somehow. Scholars eagerly
point to studies suggesting associations between some biological
abnormality and undesirable behavior as proof of an underlying, albeit
mysterious, biological agent that is implicitly responsible for the
behavior.25
While the last twenty-five years have witnessed a vast deflation of
Freud’s theory among practicing psychiatrists, those influential years
remain ingrained within the profession and popular culture. The
principle among these is the idea that psychiatry can and should have
something to say about all behavior and its explanations are superior to
others. In the United States and elsewhere, these explanations have
provided comfort to those who view the notion of free will too close to
the idea of morality since mens rea evolved from ecclesiastic law, and
hence, under the influence of organized religion.
Appearing
scientifically objective, modern law has increasingly adopted concepts
eagerly provided by the field of psychiatry, including the numerous

24. See DEREK PEREBOOM, LIVING WITHOUT FREE WILL (2001).
25. See Alison Abbott, Into the Mind of a Killer, 410 NATURE 296, 298 (2001).
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sexual paraphilias and the antisocial personality to help achieve
politically desirable ends. As law has incorporated these psychiatric
concepts into its jurisprudence, the creditability of both law and
psychiatry has faltered. One example is the pedophile, a diagnosable
mental illness under current psychiatric taximetrics despite little
evidence of a biological origin or effective treatment.26 Under the
numerous sexually violent predator (SVP) laws, pedophiles are civilly
committed for psychiatric treatment after serving their criminal
sentences since it is presumed, with the aid of its validation as a
psychiatric illness, that adult sexual preference for children is a mental
illness.27 On the opposite extreme is the unquestionably psychotic
Andrea Yates who was convicted of murder and faced a possible death
sentence until public outrage and a convenient, albeit serious error,
forced a second trial that ended in her acquittal by reason of insanity.28
These occurrences inevitably lead to popular and scholarly skepticism of
both disciplines – law and psychiatry – that hint that something is askew
and lead many to a nihilistic realism about both.
This article argues that three factors are primarily responsible for
this current state of affairs: (1) the proliferation of mental disorders in
the nosology29 of psychiatry; (2) the departure from traditional notions
of illness in psychiatry towards a vague definition of “mental disorders”;
(3) the inclusion of “personality disorders” and other phenomenon as
diagnosable mental disorders that, at first blush, appear arbitrarily
construed and sit in place of what is (or once was) considered poor
moral character. When psychiatry turned away from the term “mental
illness” to the expansive “mental disorder,” it opened a Pandora’s Box
whereby almost any behavior can be deemed an affliction of the mind –
and used by law to meet its own political ends. If law is a vehicle in
which political ideas are executed (and I think it is), psychiatry has
unwittingly given law the means to achieve politically efficient ends for
dealing with many socially and politically difficult problems. Whether

26. Interestingly, what science mostly knows about pedophilia and the sexual disorders has
nothing to do with etiology (i.e., cause) but mostly with assessing the risk that a person will commit
the aberrant sexual behavior again. Thus, psychiatric research in this area has mostly focused on
what the law considers important instead of what medical science presumably does. See AMERICAN
PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DANGEROUS SEX OFFENDERS: A TASK REPORT OF THE AMERICAN
PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION (1999).
27. See id.
28. Yates v. Texas, 171 S.W.3d 215 (Tex. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that a new trial was
required due to the prosecution’s psychiatric expert’s perjury); Woman Not Guilty in Retrial in the
Deaths of Her 5 Children, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2006, at A20.
29. Nosology is the branch of medicine that deals with classification of disease.
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through the de facto indefinite incapacitation of pedophiles30 or as an
aggravating factor in criminal sentencing of “antisocial” people,31 the
law openly rebukes the shortcomings of psychiatric diagnoses while
readily utilizing its dubious classification schemes to achieve its own
ends.32
Part I discuses the theoretical frameworks of law and science. I
discuss how law is a discipline of the humanities, and thus builds upon a
framework of logic, deduction, and belief. Free will, a fundamental
component of American criminal law, endures not due to some empirical
finding, but out of belief, historical influence of ecclesiastic law,33 and
its necessity in forming culpability, which lies at the heart of criminal
liability.34 Or to put it differently, the legal system requires a belief in
free will because public opinion demands it.35 Such demands are
30. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 372 (1997) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (discussing
the constitutionality of sexual predator civil commitment laws: “[n]otwithstanding its civil
attributes, the practical effect of the Kansas law may be to impose confinement for life.”).
31. Antisocial and psychopathic behavior has been held relevant in criminal trials and
sentencing phases despite its propensity as character evidence. See, e.g., U.S. v. Barnette, 211 F.3d
803 (4th Cir. 2003). The erosion on the prohibition of character evidence is ongoing, see, Judson F.
Falknor & David T. Steffen, Evidence of Character: From the "Crucible of the Community" to the
"Couch of the Psychiatrist", 102 U. PA. L. REV. 980 (1954); cf. Aviva Orenstein, Deviance, Due
Process, and the False Promise of Federal Rule of Evidence 403, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1487 (2005).
32. Compare Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 360 (1997) ("The mental health
professionals who evaluated Hendricks diagnosed him as suffering from pedophilia, a condition the
psychiatric profession itself classifies as a serious mental disorder.”), with Addington v. Texas, 441
U.S. 418, 429 (1979) ("Given the lack of certainty and the fallibility of psychiatric diagnosis, there
is a serious question as to whether a state could ever prove beyond a reasonable doubt that an
individual is both mentally ill and likely to be dangerous."). More to the point, perhaps, is that the
deep skepticism the courts eschew towards psychiatry evaporates nearly instantly when psychiatric
ideas serve a desirable end. But see Clark v. Arizona, 126 S. Ct. 2709, 2734 (2006) (quoting Powell
v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 537 (1968) (“It is simply not yet the time to write into the Constitution
formulas cast in terms whose meaning, let alone relevance, is not yet clear . . . to doctors.”));
Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 359 (“[T]he term ‘mental illness’ is devoid of any talismanic significance . . .
. [T]he Court itself has used a variety of expressions to describe the mental condition of those
properly subject to civil confinement.”). Although the court in Hendricks held that it was not bound
by psychiatric classifications in upholding the Kansas statute and its mental abnormality provision,
the very idea that pedophilia is a mental abnormality and not merely a moral failing is borne by
psychiatry and its long preoccupation with sexual behavior. One wonders whether the court would
have easily came to the same holding had the psychiatric nosology foregone classifying any sexual
behavior as a mental disorder –or even expressly forbade it.
33. In terms of criminal law, the greatest effect of ecclesiastic law was its concern for
culpability and intent over strict liability. See NORMAN J. FINKEL, INSANITY ON TRIAL 5-7 (1988).
34. Culpability seems to most contemporary scholars and the lay public as an absolute
necessity in criminal law for the most serious crimes; yet, it is arguably the most difficult element of
a crime to discern in terms of guilt or innocence. From sex offenders to diminished capacity, the
strongest opinions among the lay and learned are often associated with areas that have the least
scientific weight to support them.
35. One way to empirically examine the free will paradigm is by looking at deterrence.
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political and not purely deduced from observation and represent cultural
and historical influences. While free will is not solely a social
construction as it can be inferred from observation of behavior across
cultures, it cannot be proven in a pure scientific sense. Modern
psychiatry, on the other hand, posits itself as a natural science which
draws upon empiricism, observation, and experimentation. Indeed, the
exponential growth in understanding mental disorders such as
schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and major depression have occurred
primarily through biological psychiatry which is most faithful to the
tenets of the scientific method. In these major mental disorders,
biological psychiatry has demonstrated that a disease process has eroded
the normal operations of the brain. In other areas that psychiatry claims
as mental disorder, such as antisocial personalities, what biological
evidence exists is weak and scientists are hard-pressed to show how
these deficits are indicative of a disease process.
These differing approaches between law and psychiatry lie in
tension, as can be most clearly seen in examining the insanity defense.
The law is interested in whether the defendant knew right from wrong at
the moment of the alleged wrongdoing.36 Modern psychiatry views
psychotic behaviors as outward manifestations of a disease process that
impairs rational thinking. The law is concerned with individual choice
and free will, a concept that rests mostly upon belief in its existence.
Psychiatry is concerned with rationality via the processing of sensory
data within the brain to achieve an accurate representation of the

Presumably, if deterrence works then free will among rational agents can be assumed. The success
of anti-drunk driving campaigns suggests deterrence works. See Jonathan P. Shepherd, Criminal
Deterrence as a Public Health Strategy, 358 THE LANCET 1717 (2001). Likewise some argue that
there is a negative relationship between crime rates and incarceration rates. See Steven D. Levitt,
The Effect of Prison Population Size on Crime Rates: Evidence from Prison Overcrowding
Litigation, 111 Q. J. ECON. 319 (1996). There is also evidence that perceived deterrence in drug
courts is associated with better outcomes. See Douglas B. Marlowe et al., Perceived Deterrence
and Outcomes in Drug Courts, 23 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 183 (2005). However, others have maintained
that evidence for deterrent effects is weak. Jane Goodman-Delahunty, Dealing with the Guilty
Offender, in PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW: AN EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVE 445, 450-53 (Neil Brewer &
Kipling D. Williams eds., 2005).
36. Indeed, knowing right from wrong appears to be the foremost question in the insanity test
and other questions, including questions of cognitive ability to understand and appreciate one’s own
actions and behaviors, have been held as superfluous. See, Clark v. Arizona, 126 S. Ct. 2709, 272223 (2006) (“Though Clark is correct that the application of the moral incapacity test (telling right
from wrong) does not necessarily require evaluation of a defendant's cognitive capacity to
appreciate the nature and quality of the acts charged against him, his argument fails to recognize
that cognitive incapacity is itself enough to demonstrate moral incapacity. Cognitive incapacity, in
other words, is a sufficient condition for establishing a defense of insanity, albeit not a necessary
one.”).
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external world. By examining the normal and mentally disordered brain,
psychiatry claims it can identify the locations and processes whereby the
brain goes awry. But these claims are made entirely through
comparisons of people considered normal to those who are determined
disordered under the guise that normality is a verifiable fact. Again, in
the presence of signs of disease this claim is not that farfetched; but in its
absence, the claim is troublesome. Law can claim things because it does
not posit itself as a science; when psychiatry does so, it is a different
affair altogether. It is not that the two disciplines speak the same truth
but in different languages – they speak entirely different truths that
underscore their epistemological differences.
Part II discusses the evolution of psychiatry using the evolution of
psychiatric diagnoses as a backdrop. Essential to this understanding is
the fact that psychiatry as a formal discipline is a fairly new
phenomenon. Within about 200 years, psychiatry has grown from a
cadre of physicians caring for institutionalized persons, to one of the
leading authorities on behavior, motivations, and how the brain
interfaces with the metaphysical mind. Much of this growth occurred
during the Freudian school’s zenith during the 1940s and 1950s. During
this period two critical events happened that forever changed mental
health in the United States. First and foremost, Freudian psychoanalysis
brought professional psychiatry out of the institutions and into the
communities. Professional mental health was no longer reserved for
those afflicted by serious mental illnesses; rather, it was culturally
permissive for anyone to seek out the wisdom of the profession. This
simple but sudden transition made psychiatry a private and profitable
industry with the lure set for mental health to become part and parcel of
everyday living. Problems that occurred as a matter of routine living –
disputes between spouses, questions about child-rearing, sexual drives –
were now psychiatric matters. The other critical event was the discovery
of effective drugs in treating many mental illnesses. This had the effect
of lending psychiatry the credibility that it could successfully treat what
it designated as mental illnesses and began the era of biological
psychiatry.
Central to understanding psychiatry’s growth and influence in
modern culture is an appreciation regarding the evolution of the
diagnostic manuals the professional has used in deciding what qualifies
as a mental illness. The American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic
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and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM)37 is the cornerstone
of psychiatric taxonomy. This psychiatric “bible” determines what
behaviors will receive precious funding from federal agencies such as
the National Institute of Mental Health as well as who can be committed
against their will. The current Fourth Edition relies heavily upon the
biopsychosocial model of mental illness that emphasizes that mental
illnesses have biological, psychological, and social aspects.38 This,
however, is a departure from the 1952 first edition which was heavily
laden with Freudian notions of mental illness. I will examine the
development of the DSM, most notably, the explosion of diagnosable
mental disorders from about 100 in the First Edition to almost 300 in the
current version.39 I will argue that while the present edition is more
biologically focused than its processors, it has lost sight of mental
illnesses as diseases – and as such the classification scheme itself is in
question. Thus, the present edition includes diagnoses such as “caffeine
intoxication”40 and “substance induced anxiety disorder”41 – behaviors
reminiscent of what Szasz said were the “tragedies of life”42 but hardly
illnesses as commonly understood.
Part III discusses why the term “mental disorder” is a myth: it
incorporates behaviors that are not illnesses as traditionally construed
and lack substantive biological manifestations of a disease process.
Under the present classification scheme, pedophilia is a mental illness
alongside with schizophrenia and manic-depression. In looking at law
and psychiatry, mental disorders as currently construed hardly seem
faithful to Blackstone’s conception of the “wild beast”43 that clearly
pointed to a person so bereft of sanity that the law should take notice and
treat differently. The modern use of dubious notions of mental disorders

37. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS – TEXT REVISION (4th ed. 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV-TR].
38. See Engel, supra note 2.
39. See Rick Mayes & Allan V. Horwtiz, DSM-III and the Revolution in Classification of
Mental Illness, 41 J. HIST. BEHAV. SCI. 249, 251 (2005) (reporting the First edition of the DSM with
106 diagnoses at 130 pages in length with the Fourth Edition with 297 diagnoses at 886 pages);
Lloyd H. Rogler, Making Sense of the Historical Changes in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
of Mental Disorders: Five Propositions, 38 J.HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 9, 13-16 (1997) (stating that
the growth of the DSM is partially due to the inclusion of more disorders and the splitting into
subcategories of previously unitary disorders).
40. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 37, at 232-34. The DSM-IV states the obvious: Ingestion of
caffeine can lead to, inter alia, restlessness, nervousness, excitement, insomnia, flushed face,
muscle twitching, and increased heart rate.
41. Id. at 483.
42. SZASZ, supra note 1, at 1574.
43. See Blackstone, supra 22 and accompanying text.
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encourages psychiatric defenses in criminal law such as the various
“syndrome” defenses44 that push the envelope of creditability and
engender abuse by political forces seeking their own objectives. I will
present several examples of how vague “mental disorders” have been
used by law to pursue apparent political ends. My thesis is that modern
psychiatry has transformed many forms of amoral character into
classified mental disorders; from actions of the imperfect, free agent into
behaviors of the afflicted. This effect is far more insidious than most
people realize. It is not just what the official psychiatric manual
classifies as a mental disorder that matters. Rather, it is the underlying
belief that all behavior can be explained under a psychiatric lens and that
this explanation is superior to others. This outlook has pervasive and
perverse consequences about how individuals and institutions approach
social problems, including illegal behavior. As many decry how the law
deals with mental illness, the law represents the most illustrative
demonstration of how law and science operating in a political world
differ in theoretical frameworks and how those approaches play out in
our imperfect world.
Part IV presents some ideas for reform and discusses why these
reforms are unlikely to happen.
I. LAW, SCIENCE, AND EPISTEMOLOGY
Conflict between law and science entails disagreements not just
about conclusions of important questions such as whether people with
severe mental illnesses may be incapable of appreciating right and
wrong.
Rather, they are steeped in traditions and practices
fundamentally at odds with one another. Law frequently asks normative
questions, science describes what is observed in nature. The goals of
law may include perfecting justice, for science it is perfecting our
understanding of material phenomenon. Law is not science, and science
should not usurp law’s claim to normative questions. The goals of each
discipline are inconsistent even when they appear identical because of
their different approaches to understanding the problem to begin with.
Law, despite the various schools of thought that may argue
otherwise, is inherently a humanity and not a science.45 As such, law’s

44. See David McCord, Syndromes, Profiles and Other Mental Exotica: A New Approach to
the Admissibility of Nontraditional Psychological Evidence in Criminal Cases, 66 OR. L. REV. 19
(1987).
45. See Gino C. Speranza, The Medico-Legal Conflict Over Mental Responsibility, 13 GREEN
BAG 123, 125 (1901) (“Law is one of the humanities.”).
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penchant lies with logic, deduction, persuasion, and belief. Despite the
sociological jurisprudence of Pound, law continues to operate upon a
system of prior beliefs that holds certain things true.46 The free moral
agent, who acts without duress and chooses action A over B is arguendo
the cornerstone of law. From contracts to criminal law, the free moral
agent is necessary for law’s function and legitimacy. In this sense, when
a person commits a criminal act like homicide, substantive criminal law
places considerable weight on the actor’s mens rea in affixing liability
and punishment. To put it differently, the fundamental question in law is
not whether to treat the defendant differently because of a mental illness,
but rather whether the individual had the requisite mens rea at a point in
time (during the actus rea).47 For law, a guilty mind is necessary insofar
as it provides legitimacy for differential punishment.48 In Western legal
traditions, punishment requires that the agent possess free will.49 This is
46. See Thomas A. Green, Freedom and Criminal Responsibility in the Age of Pound: An
Essay on Criminal Justice, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1915 (1995) (arguing that law never embraced the
empiricism of the social sciences as argued for by Pound and subsequent Realists).
47. Notwithstanding strict liability, of course. In terms of the insanity defense, while there
have been a series of different “tests” the enduring one is the M'Naughten Case, R. v. McNaughten,
8 Eng. Rep. 718 (Eng. Rep. 1843), which excuses criminal behavior if under a defect of reason or
disease of the mind a person at the time of the offense did not know the nature or quality of the act
or did not know that the act was wrong; cf. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 40.15 (Consol. 2006) that sets forth
New York’s insanity test as: At the time of such conduct, “he lacked criminal responsibility by
reason of mental disease or defect. Such lack of criminal responsibility means that at the time of
such conduct, as a result of mental disease or defect, he lacked substantial capacity to know or
appreciate either: 1. The nature and consequences of such conduct; or 2. That such conduct was
wrong.” Note that both the M’Naughten and New York test construe mental illness as a disease.
48. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.00-125.60 (2006) (designating the types and degrees of
homicide in New York). Notably, strict liability offenses rarely, if ever, are designated as high
felony crimes.
49. See Stephen J. Morse, Inevitable Mens Rea, 27 HARVARD J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 51, 62 (2003)
(arguing that mens rea is required because only it can give meaning to purposeful movements). But
compare Deborah W. Denno, Crime and Consciousness: Science and Involuntary Acts, 87 MINN. L.
REV. 269 (2002) (arguing that neuroscience findings question whether traditional notions of
consciousness, and thus, agency are correct), and Peter Arenella, Convicting the Morally Blameless:
Reassessing the Relationship Between Legal and Moral Accountability, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1511,
1611 (1992) ("The specter of determinism has had a tremendous impact on moral responsibility
theorists who work within the liberal paradigm. Operating under determinism's constant threat to
undermine liberal accounts of moral desert, these theorists have been obsessed with the problem of
defining what type of control over action is morally significant."), with Peter Westen, Getting the
Fly Out of the Bottle: The False Problem with Free Will and Determinism, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV.
599, 652 (2005) (“The supposed problem of free will and determinism is as false as the question,
‘What is the expanding universe expanding into?’ It is a problem that we have created for ourselves
by posing questions in terms that are inconsistent with the presuppositions that we must necessarily
invoke in addressing them.”), and Joseph S. Alper, Genes, Free Will, and Criminal Responsibility,
46 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1599 (1998) (arguing that genetic explanations of behavior do not negate
traditional views of free will due to the complexity of genetic/environmental interactions that
produce behavior).
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so, not based upon any observable or verifiable fact, but because of the
belief that it is so.
Contrast this with modern psychiatry,50 which most believe has
departed from its cult of personality a la Freud.51 Modern psychiatry
claims to be a natural science based upon empiricism, observation, and
experimentation. Thus, it is concerned with measurable events that
occur in the world. Given this premise, mental illnesses are understood
as behaviors resulting from a disease process in the brain.52
Schizophrenia, a mental illness defined by hallucinations, delusions, and
impaired thinking is now considered by most behavioral scientists to be
a product of structural and functional impairments of the brain.53 For
modern psychiatry then, actions of a mentally ill person are
manifestations of this disease process – and part of that process often
involves impairment of cognition.54 What matters here is that cognition,

50. Modern psychiatry has become synonymous with biological psychiatry. See Deborah W.
Denno, Criminal Acts in a Post-Freudian World, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 601, 652 (2005) (“[T]he
DSM-IV and leading psychiatric journals now predominantly stress the biological component of
mental illness.”).
51. See Carl I. Cohen, The Biomedicalization of Psychiatry: A Critical Overview, 29
COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH J. 29, 29-30 (1993) (noting that biological psychiatry is now the
dominant version of psychiatry); Samuel H. Barondes, The Biological Approach to Psychiatry:
History and Prospects, 10 J. NEUROSCIENCE 1707, 1707-08 (1990) (discussing the rise of
biological psychiatry). Freudian psychiatry was not based on empiricism, rather it was entirely
theoretical. See E. FULLER TORREY, FREUDIAN FRAUD: THE MALIGNANT EFFECT OF FREUD'S
THEORY ON AMERICAN THOUGHT AND CULTURE 240-54 (1992) (arguing that Freudian psychiatry
was both illegitimate and harmful to patients); cf. Alan A. Baumeister & Mike F. Hawkins,
Continuity and Discontinuity in the Historical Development of Modern Psychopharmacology, 14 J.
HIST. NEUROSCIENCES 199 (2005) (arguing the Freudian psychiatry did not constitute a paradigm
and that the rise of biological psychiatry was the culmination of a linear growth of knowledge, and
hence, there has been no true paradigm “shift”).
52. Again, I presume that modern psychiatry is synonymous with biological psychiatry, a
view that some may disagree with. In terms of the full panoply of “mental disorders,” there are
surely some diagnoses that are not products of diseases of the brain such as Adjustment Disorder or
Bereavement, see DSM-IV-TR, supra note 37, at 679-740, but may represent some transient
biological change or process reflective of (usually) an event that a person observes and
contemplates about. As I will discuss in Section IV, however, I do not construe these as mental
illnesses.
53. See Christos Pantelis et al., Structural Brain Imaging for Multiple Pathological Processes
at Different Stages of Brain Development, 31 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 672 (2005) (reviewing the
wealth of studies reporting numerous and significant abnormalities in brains of those afflicted with
schizophrenia including progressive changes that occur during the earliest stages of the disease,
often before the initiation of pharmacotherapy). See also STEVEN R. HIRSCH & DANIEL
WEINBERGER, SCHIZOPHRENIA (Blackwell Science Ltd. 2003) (1995) for a general discussion on
the various brain abnormalities associated with schizophrenia.
54. See TONMOY SHARMA & PHILIP HARVEY, COGNITION IN SCHIZOPHRENIA: IMPAIRMENTS,
IMPORTANCE AND TREATMENT STRATEGIES (2000); MICHAEL F. GREEN, SCHIZOPHRENIA FROM A
NEUROCOGNITIVE PERSPECTIVE: PROBING THE IMPENETRABLE DARKNESS (1998); KEITH S.
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from a psychiatric perspective, is not an idea but instead a measurable
enterprise of the brain. Generally speaking, impaired cognition in the
brain of a person with schizophrenia or other severe mental illness
equates with deficiencies in attention, information processing, memory,
These elements of cognition are
planning, and intelligence.55
measurable56 and have salience to legal questions insofar as they explain
irrational behavior. Moreover, from this perspective, the concern in
terms of “mens rea” is not understood in terms of whether a defendant
possessed knowledge of right or wrong at a specific time. Instead, a
brain injured by mental illness is damaged because of a progression of
disease that results in impairment, and subsequent behavior is a visible
product of the pathogenic process inside the brain. This, of course, does
not mean that all behavior from a person afflicted with a mental illness,
such as schizophrenia, is excusable or deficient. What it does illustrate,
however, is that psychiatry views the behavior in these individuals as
heavily influenced by a disease that is often degenerative and lifelong.57
As such, even during periods of lucidity, behaviors of a person afflicted
with an illness such as schizophrenia are affected and bear the markings
of the disease58 lending understanding to important social and legal
questions.59 While law wants to know whether a person with a mental
DOBSON & PHILIP C. KENDALL, PSYCHOPATHOLOGY AND COGNITION (1993); HIRSCH &
WEINBERGER, supra note 53.
55. See GREEN, supra note 54, at 41-57; SHARMA & HARVEY, supra note 54, at 3-126.
56. Green’s book provides an excellent explanation in non-technical language how cognition
is measured. GREEN, supra note 54.
57. See James D. Hegarty et al., One Hundred Years of Schizophrenia: A Meta-Analysis of the
Outcome Literature, 151 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1409 (1994) (reporting less than half of those with
schizophrenia have overall improvements in premorbid functioning); George Bartzokis,
Schizophrenia: Breakdown in the Well-regulated Lifelong Process of Brain Development and
Maturation, 27 NEUROPSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 672 (2002) (reporting on the life-long reduction of
grey matter in the brains of schizophrenia patients); Robert K. McClure et al., Neurodevelopmental
and Neurodegenerative Hypotheses of Schizophrenia, 16 CURRENT OPINION IN PSYCHIATRY S15
(2003) (discussing the re-emergence of the neurodegenerative hypothesis of schizophrenia).
58. See Brian Kirkpatrick et al., The NIH-MATRICS Consensus Statement on Negative
Symptoms, 32 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 214 (2006) [hereinafter Consensus Statement]; Tonmoy
Sharma & Lena Antonova, Cognitive Function in Schizophrenia, Deficits, Functional
Consequences, and Future Treatment, 26 PSYCHIATRIC CLINICS N. AM. 25 (2003) (reviewing
studies that strongly suggest an enduring cognitive dysfunction in schizophrenia and cognition as a
strong predictor of functional, long-term outcome).
59. See generally Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1018 (8th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
419 (U.S. 1994) (holding that it is constitutionally permissible to forcibly medicate a mentally ill
convict to be competent for execution); but see Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 137-38 (1992)
(holding that a mentally ill defendant should be allowed to forego forcible medication to allow the
jury to “assess Riggins” demeanor fairly) and Sell v. U.S., 539 U.S. 166 (2003) (holding that the
state may forcibly medicate mentally ill defendants only under certain limited circumstances). The
issue of cognition, mental illness and constitutionality has been, in my opinion, grossly
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illness had moral capacity during a crime,60 science cannot answer that
question in the purest sense since morality is not a scientific question.
Nor does psychiatry conceive of behaviors occurring during a single
point in time in isolation of other factors as particularly meaningful.
Thus, whether a defendant like Andrea Yates had called the police after
she killed her children and admitted that she had done something
wrong61 matters a lot to legal conceptions of insanity, but little to
science. From a scientific perspective, Yates had a demonstrable history
of psychosis, which is an illness that severely undermines perception and
judgment that is best understood by examining behaviors in totem.
From a legal perspective, one could argue that Yates was indeed sane;62
from a scientific one, she was clearly crazy.
A. Competency as an Exemplar
One way to understand the premise of mental disease as I have
outlined is by examining competency. The law holds that only
competent persons may make contracts, make health care decisions, or
stand trial in criminal proceedings.63 Psychiatric and psychological
scholarship is replete with empirical studies, reviews, and commentaries
on the issue of competency64 while the law, generally, makes short shrift
of it.65 This can be explained partly because the law views agents in an
misconstrued in a one sided, erroneous argument that antipsychotic medications are “mind altering
drugs” when the overwhelming scientific evidence is to the contrary. Nonetheless, such arguments
point to the importance of cognition and mental illness in the law. See generally Thomas G. Gutheil
& Paul S. Appelbaum, "Mind Control," "Synthetic Sanity," "Artificial Competence," and Genuine
Confusion: Legally Relevant Effects of Antipsychotic Medications, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 77 (1983)
and Steven K. Erickson et al., Legal Fallacies of Antipsychotic Drugs (Dec. 5, 2006) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Yale Univ. Sch. Med. Psychiatry Working Paper Series), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=949229.
60. See Clark v. Arizona, 126 S. Ct. 2709, 2722-23 (2006) (discussing moral capacity in the
insanity defense).
61. See Jim Yardley, Texas Jury Convicts Mother Who Drowned Her Children, N. Y. TIMES,
Mar. 13, 2002, at A7 (discussing the impact of Yates’ confession and 911 call).
62. See, e.g., Park Dietz Associates, Report of Dr. Dietz Regarding Andrea Yates, Feb. 25,
2002,
http://www.parkdietzassociates.com/files/Report_of_Dr._Park_Dietz_re._Andrea_Yates__2002.pdf
(claiming that Yates was sane at the time of the murders).
63. See John Petrila, From Constitution to Contracts: Mental Disability Law at the Turn of
the Century, in THE EVOLUTION OF MENTAL HEALTH LAW 75, 75-100 (2001).
64. A search of the psychology/psychiatry database PSYCHINFO under the heading
“competency” indicated 5,632 hits. American Psychological Association, APA PsycNET,
http://psycnet.apa.org/ (visited Apr. 1, 2006).
65. There are likely two indications of this: 1. The seminal U.S. Supreme Court decision on
competency to stand trail, Dusky v. United States, was a half-page, per curium decision (see Dusky
v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (“[T]he test must be whether he has sufficient present ability
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efficient dichotomy of either competent or incompetent and sets the bar
fairly low.66 It is dichotomous and presumed rudimentary. Psychiatry
makes much ado about competency because it understands competency
as entailing rationality, which can be profoundly affected by mental
illnesses.67 But this profundity is not merely one of severity; it is the
sensitive fluidity and fragility of the mental state enmeshed in muted
symptoms that are directly pertinent to competency that also bears
concern.68 That is to say, mental illnesses can (and often do) cause
irrational behavior, but the impairments that lead to the behavior
vacillate frequently and often without demonstrable outward
manifestations.69 A person with schizophrenia who is lucid one day and
over the next few days becomes convinced that the judge and lawyers
are all involved in a communist plot to destroy him does so often in
secret. To reveal his knowledge of this plot against him would be ever
foolish. But it is not that one day all is fine and the next day is filled
with Gulags, the K.G.B., and fear of assassinations. The delusions
overcome his sanity progressively as his brain slowly misappropriates
events in the environment into defective, cognitive perceptions. And
that is the easy case. Many mental illnesses, such as schizophrenia,
substantially degrade vital cognitive components such as information
processing and abilities to engage in planned behavior.
This
to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding--and whether he has a
rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.”); and 2. Despite some
additional case law (notably, Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975), Medina v. California, 505
U.S. 437 (1992), and Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003)), the trend has been decidedly
against expansion of the original minimal criteria set forth in Dusky. The unfortunate result is an
erosion of the competency doctrine. See, e.g., People v. Tortorici, 92 N.Y.2d 757, 773-74, 686
N.Y.S.2d 246, 97 (N.Y. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 94 (1999) (cert. denied despite
uncontroverted evidence that the prosecution’s psychiatric expert produced memoranda to trial
judge during the trial in which he stated that the defendant was incompetent to stand trail. The New
York Court of Appeals held there was no abuse of discretion by the trial court); see also, A Crime of
Insanity (PBS television broadcast Oct. 17, 2002 on Frontline) (transcript available at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/crime/etc/script.html) (providing an overview of
People v. Tortorici). Compare with, Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385; 86 S. Ct. 836, 842 (1966)
(holding that a defendant's competency is so crucial to legitimate criminal adjudication that where
there exists a "bona fide doubt" as to the defendant's competency, a hearing, even sua sponte by the
court is required on Constitutional grounds); Drope, 420 U.S. 162 (determining that medical
opinions are vital to determining a defendant's competency in a criminal matter).
66. Again, the Dusky decision, which established the substantive part of the competency to
stand trail, suggests that while a “rational as well as factual understanding” is constitutionally
required, a strong argument can be made that the test is neither complex nor demanding. Dusky, 362
U.S. at 402.
67. See Stephen J. Morse, Rationality and Responsibility, 74 S. CAL. L REV 251 (2000)
(discussing rationality in terms of mental capacity in the mentally ill).
68. See GREEN, supra note 54, at 25-26.
69. Id.; see also Consensus Statement, supra note 58.
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pathological degradation occurs almost entirely sub silentio and has
direct relevance to legal questions such as competency, but is often
overlooked.70
The importance of these differences between the law and psychiatry
lies not with details, such as whether the law treats competency as overly
simplistic71 or psychiatry misconstrues legal relevancy with clinical
judgment.72 Instead, it is important to note the different approaches each
discipline undertakes towards issues such as competency. Law seeks
efficient rules founded upon persuasive doctrines because they
encompass values, such as fairness and justice, that are rooted in larger
rules (perhaps of recognition)73 adjudged as authoritative. The goal is
not aggregating data to reach a consensus. As such, the findings of
scientific research are only useful insofar as they clarify difficult
questions of fact. Alternatively, they are almost universally obstructive
when they suggest permutations to legal doctrine. Consequently, when
science attempts to provide answers to legal questions, it often does so in
an unaccommodating manner wholly inconsistent with law’s objectives.
Is caffeine addictive? Science tells us that the answer is probably yes
because mounting evidence suggests withdrawal from caffeine produces
physiologic changes associated with addiction.74 What is the law to do
with this empirical conclusion?75 Of equal importance, what does
psychiatry do with it? As will be discussed, infra, the trend is
troublesome.

70. Surprisingly, there have been little neuropsychological or neuropsychiatric studies
examining cognition and competency. There has been one notable study, however. See Paul G.
Nestor et al., Competence to Stand Trial: A Neuropsychological Inquiry, 23 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 397
(1999).
71. See Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 398 (1993) ("And while the decision to plead guilty
is undeniably a profound one, it is no more complicated than the sum total of decisions that a
defendant may be called upon to make during the course of a trial.").
72. See Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, The Evolution of Adolescence: A Developmental
Perspective on Juvenile Justice Reform, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 137, 152 (1997) ("[some]
argue that minors are less capable of sound judgment, because of impulsiveness and a reduced
capacity to appreciate the consequences of their acts, and thus are less culpable than adult
offenders.").
73. See generally H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 91 (1961).
74. Compare Aviel Goodman, Addiction: Definition and Implications, 85 BRIT. J.
PSYCHIATRY 1403 (1403) with DSM-IV-TR, supra note 37.
75. See, e.g., Stephen J. Morse, Addiction, Genetics, and Criminal Responsibility, 69 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 165, 171 (2006) (“Criminal law’s concept of the person, including the addict, is
the antithesis of the medical model’s mechanistic concept.”).
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B. The Tribulation of Free Will and Tributary of Rationality
The 1990s was dubbed by the scientific community as the “decade
of the brain” given the tremendous advances in our understanding of
how the brain works and influences universal experiences of perception,
sensation, and judgment.76 These discoveries were indeed impressive,
aided much by refined technologies that allowed researchers
unprecedented access to the delicate chemical processes occurring on
almost infinitely vast scales.77 Science has indeed learned much about
the brain and many renowned scholars have imputed that these
continued discoveries are the death nail for many ontological ideas
important to law.78 But the rush to these imprudent conclusions is
foolish and neglectful: foolish because the analytical reasoning from
scientific results to erudition about the human condition is often fraught
with mistake; neglectful because such conclusions ignore how science
can provide new methods which validate entrenched social norms.79
Volumes have been written by many wise scholars about the nature
of free will and its vexing premise in an evolving scientific world.
Briefly put, many have questioned whether free will exists and whether
its inclusion as a precept in law can survive our growing understanding
of the mind and human behavior.80 But as one wise scholar has insisted,
these questions wholly misconstrue the relevancy of such empirical
findings.81 Law holds that people act for reasons and presumes that such
persons have the potential to be guided by beliefs, discernment, and
logic. While even a dog can learn to avoid food it desires because of
past negative conditioning, only humans can provide reasons for their
behavior. This is true not because a laboratory experiment informs us
so, but because our collective experiences as humans informs us so.
Thus, culpability under the law is inherently a moral and political
76. See generally Edward G. Jones & Lorne M. Mendell, Assessing the Decade of the Brain,
284 SCI. 739 (1999).
77. Id.
78. See Matthew Jones, Overcoming the Myth of Free Will in Criminal Law: The True Impact
of the Genetic Revolution, 52 DUKE L.J. 1031 (2003).
79. See Joshua Greene & Jonathan Cohen, For the Law, Neuroscience Changes Nothing and
Everything, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS: BIOLOGICAL SCI. 1775 (2004).
80. See Jones, supra note 78 (arguing that genetic influences on behavior make traditional
notions of criminal liability outdated and suggesting that future punishment will solely be justified
by utilitarian arguments); Arenella, supra note 49; RICHARD DOUBLE, THE NON-REALITY OF FREE
WILL (1990).
81. See Morse, supra note 67, at 252-53 (“When we [speaking of law] want to know why an
agent intentionally behaved as she did, we do not desire a biophysical explanation, as if the person
were simply biophysical flotsam and jetsam. Instead, we seek the reason she acted, the desires and
beliefs that formed the practical syllogism that produced intentional conduct.”).
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question implemented under substantive criminal law.82 Law’s power
lies in its assumption that people are rational creatures who understand
rules and can conform their behavior accordingly.83 Mental capacity to
accomplish this requirement is presumed because a coherent regimen of
law is only possible under such an assumption. Free will is manifest
through rational behavior and irrational behavior indicates the possibility
of a fundamental disturbance of the mind which renders free will
powerless or destroys it entirely.
Thus, the important contribution of science and psychiatry to legal
questions lies in its adduction of empirical findings to legal principles.
Science is helpful when it can coalesce salient observations that help law
achieve its goals of determinacy, efficiency, and moral legitimacy.84
During the past twenty-five years there has been a veritable flood of
empirical findings in the discipline of psychiatry. As a consequence,
psychiatry was transformed from its Freudian past to its present state as
a natural science. The importance of this transformation cannot be
overstated. Often overlooked is the fact that Freud’s theories of
behavior were not true because of any scientific finding, but because he
and his followers envisioned all behaviors as congruent with their
ontological vision of humanity. In this sense, Freud’s theories share a
similarity with law since both fundamentally rest upon normative
dictum.85 Modern psychiatry, however, rests on scientific principles,
namely, hypotheses that are testable, replicable, and falsifiable.86 Its
modern contribution to law, then, lies in its promise to validate, clarify,
and summarize clinical understandings of behavior within legal
frameworks.
To put it a different way, modern psychiatry’s
transformation to a natural science means that “proof” of its claims
regarding illnesses of the mind must satisfy the trial of the scientific
method; it must also apply its findings outside of the scientific paradigm
to that of law to preserve its legitimacy in law.

82. See generally Meir Dan-Cohen, Responsibility and the Boundaries of the Self, 105 HARV.
L. REV. 959 (1992) (discussing culpability as it relates to responsibility, which itself exists in a
political and social context).
83. See Morse, supra note 67, at 253.
84. The recent Supreme Court decision in Clark v. Arizona, 126 S. Ct. 2709, 2712 (2006),
presents an interesting view of how the Court construes morality and insanity insofar as moral
capacity is deemed synonymous with cognitive capacity.
85. Of course, the empirical legal studies movement and even natural law scholars would beg
to differ. Yet I believe that even if they are right, the propensity of law is one of a priori reasoning.
See Green, supra note 46, at 2045-47 (“Wharton’s pact with the angels survives,” and “[W]e mainly
indulge the presumption [of free will] that underpins the law.”).
86. See THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (4th ed. 2005).
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Such an undertaking is vexing if not impossible as the paradigms of
science and law, as previously discussed, are inherently in tension. Even
the founder of sociological jurisprudence himself seemed to understand
this as he posited, “there will be much experimenting, some fumbling
and much dissatisfaction.”87 Despite the impression that science and law
do speak different languages, I do not find them entirely incompatible,
for law does exist in the empirical world and science is contemplated by
people who reason and judge by their humanity. What is necessary,
therefore, is that contributions of one to the other remain faithful to their
essential principles and modest in their demand that the one
accommodate the other. To clarify this position, I present the following
example.
As mentioned previously, the law can exist only if it presumes that
people are rational beings – that their behavior is guided by justifiable
beliefs executed by a mind that can perceive accurately the world in
which it operates.88 There will likely be disagreements among scholars
for generations or longer as to what constitutes rationality (surely history
is a testament to this). Nonetheless, it is my sense that when we speak of
rationality we are talking about the ability of the mind to engage in goal
directed behavior when it can accurately comprehend the world in which
it exists. This implies that cognition is vital to rationality insofar as the
mind is not conceived as working divorced from its biological processes.
Of course, this brings up the mind-brain dualism of Descartes which has
perplexed scholars for centuries. This quandary is, I think, beyond an
answer with certitude and one of the mysteries that will likely intrigue
perpetually.89 Rather than enter that everlasting contemplation, it is

87. RAYMOND FOSDICK ET AL., CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CLEVELAND 559, 588 (Roscoe Pound
& Felix Frankfurter eds., 1922).
88. See Morse, supra note 67, at 255; cf. Jose L. Bermudez, Normativity and Rationality in
Delusional Disorder, 16 MIND & LANGUAGE 457, 462 (2001) (“Rational agents with determinate
goals in mind and reasonably defined conceptions of how those goals can be achieved by behaving
in the relevant ways.”); David Hodgson, Responsibility and Good Reasons, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
471, 474 (2005) (“While it is true that the commonsense notion of rationality does involve such
things as the ability to perceive accurately and reason instrumentally, it also (and crucially) involves
consciousness, and, in particular, the ability to make conscious decisions and exercise conscious
control over one's actions.”). There has been much discussion of late about intentionality and its
relation to rationality and mental illness. This seems correct to me, yet I remain skeptical that it is
entirely normative. See Bolton, supra note 21 for a general discussion.
89. But I think that Dr. Andreasen gets it right when she says: “One heuristic solution,
therefore, is to adopt the position that the mind is the expression of the activity of the brain and that
these two are separable for purposes of analysis and discussion but inseparable in actuality.” Nancy
C. Andreasen, Linking Mind and Brain in the Study of Mental Illnesses: A Project for Scientific
Psychopathology, 275 SCI. 1586, 1586 (1997).
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more fruitful to discuss a more salient notion when examining law and
mental illness.
One way modern psychiatry provides relevant understanding to the
law is by explaining how mental illnesses affect cognition, and hence,
rationality.90 Many mental illnesses, such as schizophrenia, have
profound effects on cognitive processes. What matters here is that these
processes are measurable and discoverable in harmony with scientific
principles. This is in contrast to claims made by psychiatry in the past,
such as concluding that seeing a reflection in an inkblot was tantamount
to narcissistic personality.91 Moreover, these findings have direct
relevancy to important legal questions, such as competency and insanity
defenses. Thus, in this example, psychiatry can prudently dispense its
understandings of behavior to law’s domain. This is so because
psychiatry can be faithful to its scientific principles while also imparting
its understandings of behavior in a manner that understands the
importance of law’s presumption of rationality to its own enterprises.
Law and science are different animals so to speak, but science can
inform law about human behavior and law can (and should) learn these
important lessons. Yet, science must be science, and thus, only claims
supported by the scientific method should be held out as scientific truths.
Much of undesirable behaviors now classified by psychiatry as mental
disorders fail this vital test. Understanding how this happened begins
with a brief history of the institution of psychiatry and its growth as a
powerful political force in popular culture.
II. ILLNESS, DISORDER, AND INSTITUTIONS
If we lived in a perfect world, science would remain faithful to its
method and law perhaps would be synonymous with natural law. Of
course, we do not live in such a world. Rather, the present state of
psychiatry has as much to do with the political institution it created as
with science. Understanding the conflict between law and psychiatry
requires an understanding of psychiatry’s tremendous growth during its
relatively short history. This history is a story of the rise of a noble
profession, its fall from public favor, and resurrection through the power
of biological sciences and drugs. It is also a story of how a medical
90. There are surely others. As will be discussed, infra, the demarcation between what is
relevant or not lies, I think, in psychiatry’s faithfulness to the idea of disease.
91. See Steven K. Erickson, Psychological Testimony on Trial: Questions Arise About the
Validity of Popular Testing Methods, 75(6) N.Y. ST. B. J. 19, 22 (2003). James M. Wood et al., The
Misperception of Psychopathology: Problems With the Norms of the Comprehensive System for the
Rorschach, 8 CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY: SCI. & PRAC. 350, 362 (2001).
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profession became the leading authority on behavior by its timely
assumption as the expert.
Psychiatry has long struggled with defining mental illnesses. The
father of American psychiatry, Benjamin Rush, noted the hardship he
would endure in formulating his understanding of mental illnesses at the
outset of his famous treatise, Medical Inquiries and Observations Upon
the Disease of the Mind:92
In entering upon the subject of the following Inquires and
Observations, I feel as if I were about to tread upon consecrated
ground. I am aware of its difficulty and importance, and I thus humbly
implore that BEING, whose government extends to the thoughts of all
his creatures, so to direct mine, in this arduous undertaking, that
nothing hurtful to my fellow citizens may fall from my pen, and this
work may be the means of lessening a portion of some of the greatest
evils of human life. 93

Despite Rush’s incantation of the evils of mental disease, his pen
would soon write what was a clear departure from centuries of ascribed
dogma that mentally disordered behavior was the manifestations of
moral failings. For Rush lived in a time when there was growing interest
in finding the physical cause that drove the behavior of madmen. As
Rush stated in the succeeding pages—and in the very title of his
treatise—madmen were afflicted with a disease of the mind. Moreover,
the mind resided in the brain whose injury could destroy the mind.
Sounding very similar to today’s scholars, Rush put forth that mental
disease affected the “faculties and operations” of the mind including
“understanding, memory, imagination, passions, the principle of faith,
will, the moral faculty, conscience, and the sense of Deity.”94 Reflecting
an almost pure reductionism for his day, Rush then held that these
faculties operated through “sensation . . . perception, association,
judgment, reasoning and volition.”95 Further, these operations relied
upon “attention, reflection, contemplation, wit, consciousness.”96
Rush’s quest to understand insanity among the putative madmen of
his day was soon rivaled by other psychiatrists who wanted to expand
the notions of insanity. Rush’s formulations were concerned with
92. BENJAMIN RUSH, MEDICAL INQUIRES AND OBSERVATIONS UPON THE DISEASE OF THE
MIND (1812).
93. Id. at 9.
94. Id. at 10.
95. Id. For an interesting discussion on volition in psychiatric disorders, see also Scott
Henderson, The Neglect of Volition, 186 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 273 (2005).
96. Rush, supra note 92, at 10.
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psychosis, much of what would be considered today as schizophrenia
and manic-depressive illness, while subsequent thinkers opened the
possibility that criminal behavior was indicative of mental disease. In
writing his treatise on insanity, psychiatrist James Pritchard ushered in
the idea of moral insanity.97 Pritchard was interested in why some
people committed crimes despite heavy moral pressure of condemnation
and likely severe punishment by society. Displaying the ironic optimism
that science would reveal a pathological basis for all abnormal behavior,
while steadily trenched in the moral beliefs of his Quaker upbringing,
Pritchard conceived of a mental illness that affected persons primarily
through their feelings and judgments. Pritchard wrote of people afflicted
of this “moral insanity”:
There are those affections of the understanding of rational powers, but
there is likewise a form of mental derangement in which the
intellectual faculties appear to have sustained little or no injury, while
the disorder is manifested principally or alone, in the state of feelings,
temper, or habits . . . [m]oral and active principles of the mind are
strangely perverted or depraved; the power of self-government is lost
or greatly impaired.98

While Pritchard could hardly be blamed for his desire to understand
the unrepentant criminal, his creation of moral insanity foreshadowed
two movements that would later lay at the crux of controversy for
psychiatry. The first of these was his attempt to classify the mentally ill
in divergent categories. Pritchard saw mental illness as occurring once
in the traditional sense of lunatics and once again in the morally
depraved.99 These groups were similar only in that they both suffered
from a perceived defect in essential reasoning that deserved medical and
legal consideration. From that point on, the “mad” and “bad” were very
different; from their symptoms to prognosis they were worlds apart. Yet
Pritchard’s treatise also foretold psychiatry’s penchant to explain amoral
behavior and transgressions by way of a sickness model.100 The obvious
question to Pritchard and his contemporaries was why anyone would
engage in amoral behavior – especially extreme cruelty such as sadistic
97. Interestingly, this concept of moral insanity sounds somewhat similar to the “moral
capacity” enounced by the Supreme Court in Clark; yet few believe that the court was attempting to
broaden the insanity defense to include the psychopathic criminal. See Clark v. Arizona, 126 S. Ct.
2709, 2722-23 (2006).
98. JAMES COWLES PRICHARD, TREATISE ON INSANITY AND OTHER DISORDERS AFFECTING
THE MIND 11 (1837).
99. Id.
100. Id.
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rape – when it was presumed that healthy biology with plenty of social
reinforcement strongly urged conforming to moral, orderly behavior.101
Some contemporaries have argued that this behavior may have a quite
rational, evolutionary basis.102 Moreover, Pritchard’s vision that certain
people with a strong predilection towards antisocial behavior may be
indicative of a categorical group with physiological anomalies was
insightful for his time.103 Yet it also foreshadowed how psychiatry
would “medicalize” behavior that it deemed abnormal despite little or no
empirical findings to lend credence to its conclusions. Psychiatry
wanted to explain these behaviors through a quasi-medical lens because
once it had transformed these behaviors into medical diagnoses; it could
then seek to restore normality through psychiatric approaches. Of
course, it also could remove moral judgment in favor of medical
judgment and give itself tremendous power in science, law, and society
by being the arbiters of behavior.
A. Building an Institution
Power often comes to institutions when they have the ability to
declare that certain things are so — a form of ipse dixit that comes with
the complexity of a corpus of knowledge propagated by the very
institution itself. The law is like this. It is not unfathomable that most
people could probably navigate the original tax code whereas today it
seems a labyrinth only chartable by the astute tax attorney.104 Thus, the
101. The moral insanity persona that Prichard posed was later explored in the legendary book
by Hervey Cleckley and later by Robert Hare. It has been transformed into the psychopathic
personality that is ubiquitous in modern culture. See HERVEY M. CLECKLEY, THE MASK OF SANITY:
AN ATTEMPT TO REINTERPRET THE SO-CALLED PSYCHOPATHIC PERSONALITY (1941); ROBERT D.
HARE, WITHOUT CONSCIENCE: THE DISTURBING WORLD OF THE PSYCHOPATHS AMONG US
(Guilford Press 1999) (1934).
102. See Stuart Kinner, Psychopathy as an Adaptation: Implications for Society and Social
Psychology, in EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY AND VIOLENCE: A PRIMER FOR POLICYMAKERS AND
PUBLIC POLICY ADVOCATES 288 (Richard W. Bloom & Nancy Dess eds., 2003).
103. Within the past fifteen years, a substantive body of research has demonstrated that some
people with antisocial personalities with certain qualities are at a very high risk of recidivism. This
has led to the development of one of the best instruments – in terms of reliability and validity – that
identifies such individuals, the Hare Psychopathy Checklist (PCL). ROBERT D. HARE, HARE PCL-R
(2nd ed. 2003). This is not mere intellectual amusement, as the PCL is used extensively in
psychiatric assessments for the courts. See James F. Hemphill & Stephen D. Hart, Forensic and
Clinical Issues in the Assessment of Psychopathy, in HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY: FORENSIC
PSYCHOLOGY 87, 606 (Alan M. Goldstein & Irving B. Weiner eds., 2003). Additionally, there is
some indication of abnormal brain physiology among these “psychopaths.” See CHRISTOPHER J.
PATRICK, HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOPATHY 251-334 (2005) for a great review of these findings.
104. See Theodore J. Forstmann & Stephen Moore, Abolish the Tax Code, Not the IRS, Cato
Institute, available at http://www.cato.org/dailys/5-13-98.html (visited Apr. 7, 2006) (noting that

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2008

25

Akron Law Review, Vol. 41 [2008], Iss. 1, Art. 8
ERICKSON_FINAL

92

1/25/2008 10:30:55 AM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[41:67

power of the bar. For psychiatry, history shows that power lies in its
classification of abnormal behavior followed by its guiding the rest of us
through its nosology105 and offering treatment that is often lifelong.
1. Early Origins and Practices
Perhaps the first instance of classification of mental illness in the
United States can be traced to the census. During the hygiene movement
of the early 1800s, Congress became concerned with many social
problems that were viewed as affecting the fabric of society.106 In 1840,
the census created seven categories of official mental diseases: mania,
melancholia, monomania, paresis, dementia, dipsomania, and
epilepsy.107 As the prevalence of schizophrenia and other severe mental
illnesses continued to rise through the Nineteenth Century,108 the
psychiatric professional felt the demands to better define mental illness
and its origins. Eminent psychiatrists such as Emil Kraepelin and Paul
Eugen Bleuler, among others, responded by publishing textbooks with
the aim of describing and classifying various mental illnesses.109 In
addition, in 1913 the Committee on Statistics of the American Medical
Publishers Association (AMPA) was formed under the Census Bureau
and charged with the task of organizing the chaotic state of information
on mental illnesses.110 Up to this time, there had been little coherent
structure in how mental illnesses were described or categorized, with
several competing schools of thought vying for recognition in how
mental illnesses should be conceived overall.111

the first version of the U.S. tax code was 1 page whereas the current version is lengthier than the
entire Encyclopedia Britannica).
105. Nosology is the branch of medicine that classifies diseases.
106. See Gerald N. Grob, Origins of DSM-I: A Study in Appearance and Reality, 148 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 421 (1991).
107. Id.
108. See E. FULLER TORREY & JUDY MILLER, THE INVISIBLE PLAGUE: THE RISE OF MENTAL
ILLNESS FROM 1750 TO THE PRESENT (Rutgers University Press 2001) (1937) (examining the
precipitous rise of severe mental illnesses in the U.S. and U.K.).
109. See EMIL KRAEPELIN & ALAN R. DIEFENDORF, CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY: A TEXTBOOK FOR
STUDENTS AND PHYSICIANS (J.S. Cushing & Co. 1912) (1907); PAUL EUGEN BLEULER, TEXTBOOK
ON PSYCHIATRY (1924).
110. See Grob, supra note 106.
111. See Ming T. Tsuang et al., Toward Reformulating the Diagnosis of Schizophrenia, 157
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1041, 1042 (2000) (discussing the differences between Bleuler and Kraepelin’s
conception of schizophrenia. “Bleuler’s emphasis on theory as a means for determining the
diagnostic relevance of signs and symptoms contrasted sharply with Kraepelin’s reliance on
empirical observations.”).
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Shortly after the formation of the AMPA, along with the National
Committee for Mental Hygiene, the first standardized psychiatric
classification scheme was published in 1918.112 The Statistical Manual
for the Use of Institutions for the Insane113 was a biologically-oriented,
non-diagnostic manual that mainly served as a descriptive administrative
document for the federal government.114 The manual contained twentytwo categories of mental illnesses that were almost entirely related to
severe mental illnesses, including thirteen various forms of psychosis.
Despite its limitations for clinicians, the AMPA’s manual would endure
for thirty-five years with periodic updates.115
2. World War II and the Ideological Shift
World War II was a transformative period in the United States and
for all nations. In the United States, women went to work in the
factories as most young and middle-aged men went to fight a worldwide
enemy. But it also was a time of industrial and cultural transformation.
The nation was becoming urbanized as the industrial revolution became
entrenched in the American fabric. From 1880 to 1940 the number of
people living in cities tripled while the size of urban communities rose
by about sixty percent.116 Similarly, the population was becoming
denser as more people migrated to cities to avail themselves of the
economic benefits of industrial work.117 Psychiatry was changing as
well. As its infatuation with Freudian psychoanalysis became firmly
rooted,118 psychiatrists began to focus on the problems of everyday
life.119 More importantly, however, was the impact of mental health

112. See Grob, supra note 106.
113. COMMITTEE ON THE STATISTICS OF THE AMERICAN MEDICO-PSYCHOLOGICAL
ASSOCIATION AND BUREAU OF STATISTICS OF THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR MENTAL HYGIENE,
STATISTICAL MANUAL FOR THE USE OF INSTITUTIONS FOR THE INSANE (1918) [hereinafter AMPA
MANUAL].
114. See HERB KUTCHINS & STUART KIRK, MAKING US CRAZY 426 (1997).
115. See Grob, supra note 106.
116. United
States
Department
of
Census,
Population:
1790-1990,
http://www.census.gov/population/censusdata/table-4.pdf (reporting an increase of urban population
from 22,106,265 persons in 1890 to 74,705,338 in 1940 and for rural areas from 36,059,474 in 1890
to 57,459,231 in 1940).
117. United States Census, Population, Housing Units, Area Measurements, and Density:
1790-1990, http://www.census.gov/population/censusdata/table-2.pdf (reporting a population
density of 17.8 persons per square mile in 1890 to 37.2 in 1940).
118. See TORREY, supra note 51, at 92-103.
119. See Arthur C. Houts, Fifty Years of Psychiatric Nomenclature: Reflections on the 1943
War Department Technical Bulletin, Medical 203, 56 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 935, 940 (2000)
(discussing the transformation of psychiatric practice in the 1940s, Houts states: “Rather than being
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assignments in the armed forces. In 1941 there were thirty-five
neuropsychiatric assignments in combined forces of the army, navy, and
marines; by 1945 that number had swelled to 2,400.120 Psychiatrists in
the armed forces soon became disenchanted with the AMPA’s manual
given that it was aimed at treating the severe mental illnesses of those
confined in state institutions. Soldiers were suffering from the stresses
of war, not schizophrenia and it was not long before psychiatrists found
the novel psychoanalysis as a better means of achieving relief for battleworn soldiers.121 When the war ended, this cadre of impromptu
Freudian psychiatrists returned home and implemented their new passion
with zeal in post-war America.122 Soon this powerful group began to
flex its ideological muscle, and led by the psychiatrist William
Menninger, in 1946 they established the Group for the Advancement of
Psychiatry (GAP).123 Built on the presumption that “psychiatry should
transcend institutional care and treatment of the mentally ill”124
Menninger and his followers rallied for an overhaul of the profession.125
Realizing the power of Freud’s ideas, the psychoanalysts moved
psychiatric practice from the state hospital to the community,126 from the
mentally ill to the worried-well,127 in order to help the average man and
woman overcome the tribulations of psychosexual development.128
This ideological shift, like many things in life, was fortuitous as it
enjoyed popularity during the largest growth of psychiatry (and
psychology)129 in American history. In 1949, the National Institute of
confined to severe forms of mental illness, mental-disordered problems were viewed as arising from
life’s circumstances.”).
120. See Grob, supra note 106, at 427.
121. Houts, supra note 119, at 940 (noting that of the 11,400,000 people serving in the armed
forces in World War II, 1,000,000 were admitted to hospitals for psychiatric problems).
122. See Grob, supra note 106, at 427.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 428.
125. Menninger’s influence was powerful in both his political force and ideas. Menninger
bluntly held that psychiatry could and should help the “average” person deal with the problems of
life – a dramatic departure from previous notions that reserved psychiatric help for those afflicted
with mental disease. See William C. Menninger, Psychiatric Experiences in the War, 1941-1946,
103 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 577, 579 (1947).
126. See Grob, supra note 106, at 426-30 (noting that two thirds of the pre-World War II
members of the American Psychiatric Association had been employed in state mental hospitals
whereas by 1956, only 17% were so employed with the majority employed in outpatient settings).
127. See TORREY, supra note 10, at 8-11 (noting that the 19th century concept of mental illness
as a brain disease was replaced early by a spectrum concept that subsumed mental illness under the
broad heading of ‘mental health’).
128. See SIGMUND FREUD, THREE ESSAYS ON THE THEORY OF SEXUALITY (James Strachey
trans., 1949).
129. An important footnote is the fact that clinical psychology was nearly absent prior to
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Mental Health (NIMH) was established from legislation passed in
1946.130 As an institute within the federal National Institute of Health,
NIMH provides the central, fiscal mechanism for research and training
of American psychiatrists mainly through institutional grants to
academic medical centers. As sociologist Paul Starr notes, NIMH grew
faster than any of the other NIH Institutes in post-World War II
America:
Of the various divisions of NIH, none grew faster than the National
Institute of Mental Health (NIMH), created in 1949 under legislation
passed three years earlier. . . . Between 1948 and 1962, NIMH research
grants rose from $374,000 to $42.6 million, training grants were up
from $1.1 million to $38.6 million, but state grants rose only from $1.7
million to $6.6 million.131

NIMH was a force in psychiatry, not merely because of money, but
because it drove research and training. Thus, the ideology of America’s
academic psychiatry department, housed in the numerous medical
centers across the nation, would play a crucial role in defining mental
illness in the subsequent years. As historian Gerald Grob explained:
That psychodynamic insights quickly dominated the teaching of
psychiatry in medical schools was apparent from a GAP survey in
1959–1960. Out of 93 U.S. and Canadian institutions, 88 taught
psychodynamics, 87 taught personality growth and development, and
77 taught psychotherapy and clinical syndromes. The number of hours
in the curriculum devoted to psychiatry also quadrupled between 1940
and 1969. Virtually every chairperson of a department of psychiatry
stated unequivocally that the psychodynamic frame of reference (as
contrasted with the descriptive or organic) was dominant.132

More importantly, however, was influence that Freudian thought
had on popular culture. “Slip of the tongue,” the “unconscious,” and
“ego” are just a few examples of how Freud’s ideas have permeated
American culture. Likewise, literature, movies, and many of the
disciplines of the humanities have the indelible mark of Freud and his
declaration of human agency. And crucially, during this period,
World War II, reserved mainly as an experimental social science. However, propelled by Freudian
conceptions of behavior, clinical psychology grew rapidly in the postwar years. See SEYMOUR B.
SARASON, THE MAKING OF AN AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY (1988).
130. National Mental Health Act, 60 Stat. 421 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.), available at http://history.nih.gov/01Docs/historical/LegislativeChronologyLaws.htm.
131. PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF MEDICINE 344-46 (1982).
132. Grob, supra note 106, at 429-30. Note that “psychodynamic” is, generally speaking,
synonymous with Freudian psychoanalysis.
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psychiatry itself became a powerful force in medicine, science, law, and
various other fields. Once liberated from the care and treatment of the
mentally ill in state institutions, psychiatry was free to comment about
human sexuality, the power of institutions, religion, and almost anything
of popular concern. Psychiatry became the interpreter of human actions,
normal or abnormal, and soon care of the mentally ill was left to the few
physicians who remained in the burgeoning state hospitals.
B. Every Institution Needs a Bible
After World War II, Menninger and Group for the Advancement of
Psychiatry (GAP) began to push for a new manual of classification for
mental illnesses. The community psychiatrists working outside of the
state mental institutions were no longer treating the psychotic or
profoundly retarded, instead they were treating the populace with
psychoanalysis and its variants. In 1950, the first draft of the Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) was circulated and
then published in 1952.133
Heavily influenced by the postwar
publication of the Army’s Technical Manual, Medical 203134 in 1946,
the DSM was very different than its predecessor, Statistical Manual for
the Use of Institutions for the Insane. Published under the auspices of
the American Psychiatric Association instead of the quasi-governmental
AMPA, the DSM took a radically different approach to psychiatric
nosology. Whereas the AMPA’s manual was mainly an outgrowth of
the census form, the DSM-I was psychiatry’s first attempt to derive a
diagnostic classification manual with the clinician as its intended user.135
As a consequence, the twenty-two specific diagnoses in the AMPA
manual were discarded in favor of three broad categories: organic brain
syndromes, functional disorders, and mental deficiency. Moreover, the
DSM’s diagnoses were built upon the theoretical framework of Freudian
psychoanalysis, which assimilated the newly popular idea of mental
health within the bulwark of psychiatric expertise.136 Psychiatry had
133. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL FOR
MENTAL DISORDERS (1st ed., 1952) [hereinafter DSM-I].
134. Office of the Surgeon General, Army Service Forces, Psychiatric Disorders and
Reactions, WAR DEPT. TECHNICAL BULLETIN, MEDICAL 203, reprinted in, 56 J. CLINICAL
PSYCHOL. 935, 935-67 (2000) [hereinafter Technical Manual, Medical 203]. Scholars have noted
that the Technical Manual reflected a psychoanalytical bent and “was not influential because of its
empirical merits.” Houts, supra note 119, at 944. See also WALTER E. BARTON, THE HISTORY AND
INFLUENCE OF THE AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION 133-35 (1987).
135. See DSM-I, supra note 133.
136. Houts, supra note 119, at 943 (noting the transformation of psychiatry from biologically
oriented pre-World War II to Freudian psychoanalysis postwar).
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transformed itself from a discipline of scientists treating presumed
biological diseases to one of experts discerning normative questions of
psychological health among those with no apparent illness.
Building upon the growing number of psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists working primarily in private offices137 and clinics along
with the popularity of Freud, the DSM would become essential by
legitimizing and perpetuating an expansive model of mental disorder.138
By subsuming mental health under its authority, psychiatry entered the
postwar era armed with a new optimism that social welfare could be
improved by copious application of therapeutic “talk therapy.” Under
this novel view, individuals were not afflicted with a disease that robbed
them of rationality by destroying the brain; rather individuals were
aversely affected by relationships within systems that arrested their
progressive development.139 If one was mentally ill, it was inherently
due to environmental factors that could be explained outside of biology.
Since god was dead140 in this modern world, a new institution had to fill
the vacuum that explained why the interpersonal mattered.
If
psychotherapy was concerned with the average citizen’s psyche – in
some sense – all people were mentally sick141 and could benefit from
psychiatric treatment. Perhaps by happenstance, this new psychiatry
required lengthy treatment, often years, which guaranteed a lucrative
future for the generous number of psychiatrists leaving the armed forces.
It surely was fortuitous that Freudian analysis lent itself to the worried
well who could afford it as the number of people with severe mental
illnesses filled the asylums, bereft of any meaningful treatment.142
To understand this moment of psychiatric history entails
underscoring the establishment of the DSM. The power of any
137. See Gronfein, supra note 12.
138. The DSM has been called by many “the bible” of psychiatry and arguably no other
product of psychiatry has been more hotly debated. See generally HERB KUCHINS & STUART KIRK,
THE SELLING OF DSM: THE RHETORIC OF SCIENCE IN PSYCHIATRY 1-12 (1992).
139. Surely some would argue that this is a simplification, but I view it as quite accurate.
While Freud argued that individual instinctively desired aggression, sex, and other primitive drives,
it was society, represented by the superego, that kept these behaviors under control, but that also
caused distress in the individual. See SIGMUND FREUD, CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (James
Strachey Trans., 1962) (1961).
140. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE GAY SCIENCES (1882), reprinted in THE IDLER’S
COMPANION: AN ANTHOLOGY OF LAZY LITERATURE 208-10 (Tom Hodgkinson & Matthew De
Abaitua eds., 1997).
141. See FREUD, supra note 128 (describing “man” as the sick animal).
142. See Joseph P. Morrissey & Howard H. Goldman, Care and Treatment of the Mentally Ill
in the United States: Historical Developments and Reforms, 484 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC.
SCI. 12, 19 (1986) (reporting that in 1950, 150,000 people were located in state psychiatric hospitals
– a 240% increase since 1903).
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influential book lies not just in its ideas but in its power to transform
those who read it and are willing to be governed by its epistemology
which invariably becomes institutionalized. The birth of the DSM was a
watershed for psychiatry because it solidified the prevailing psychiatric
thought into an institution of enormous power. Several factors of this
moment are of particular note. First, the importance of DSM’s creation
in 1952 compared to the previous taxonomies of mental illnesses rested
with its institutional authority and sovereignty. The authority of the
American Psychiatric Association – the author of the DSM – lies in its
ability to declare certain behavior abnormal. The first edition of the
DSM was much like law in this way since the biological mechanisms of
mental illnesses were poorly understood and mostly abandoned in the
first edition. Thus, it held certain behaviors abnormal either because
historically they had been considered such or because they were part of a
larger entity – a disorder perhaps – that fit a theoretical model. Thus, a
neurotic person could be pronounced so not just on the authority of
psychiatry alone, but because the therapist, individually, and psychiatry
as an institution, could assert expertise as to why and how a behavior
existed. This was done not because some discovery in a laboratory
informed the psychiatric profession that it was true, but because the
powers within the profession pronounced it so. The sovereignty that the
DSM enjoyed was due to the fact that it was authored solely by the
psychiatric association itself. Whereas previous classification manuals
such as the AMPA’s manual143 were complied with direct governmental
agency direction, the DSM was solely the product of the profession
itself.
More crucially however, is that with the invention of the taxon144
“disorder,” psychiatry was now free to greatly expand behaviors that
could be included in the DSM.145 Once the profession supplanted
disease with the captious idiom disorder, all mental phenomena were
open to the speculation that they were illnesses in need of psychiatric
143. AMPA MANUAL, supra note 113.
144. Taxon generally refers to the science of taxonomy, which is the scientific classification of
groups into ordered categories. In a more specific sense, the field of taxometrics is an emergent
subfield in science that utilizes statistical methods to arrive at certain categories. This approach
holds a dichotomous view in which diseases or mental disorders are either present or not. In
contrast, the DSM is generally viewed as a dimensional approach since each diagnosis requires
several factors to be present before the diagnosis can be said to be present in a person. See NORMAN
B. SCHMIDT, ROMAN KOTOV, & THOMAS E. JOINER, TAXOMETRICS: TOWARD A NEW DIAGNOSTIC
SCHEME FOR PSYCHOPATHOLOGY (2004).
145. See William C. Follette & Arthur C. Houts, Models of Scientific Progress and the Role of
Theory in Taxonomy Development: A Case Study of the DSM, 64 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL
PSYCHOL. 1120, 1122 (1996) (discussing the taxon of mental disorder).
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intervention. So too, did this fuzzy idiom allow the line between mental
and physical be transgressed without critical appraisal. Thus, any
behavior that produced discomfort or socially undesirable behavior
could be asserted as representing a disordered psyche irrespective of
biological evidence. Whereas the old psychiatry of Pritchard and Rush
presumed biological disease despite lacking actual evidence given the
technology of their day, the psychiatry of early DSM actually disposed
of this supposition. This would be fertile ground for Szasz and others,
who a mere decade later levied heavy accusations against the psychiatric
institution by undermining its legitimacy through deconstructing the
DSM.
C. Drugs, Liberation, and Exodus
While psychiatry surely benefited from the en masse infusion of
practitioners and institutional funding it enjoyed from the federal
government in the 1950s, it was the serendipitous discovery of
psychiatric drugs that would lead to its greatest transformation. As
Freud’s ideas permeated popular culture, especially in America, the state
psychiatric asylums were in disarray. During the late 1940s and early
1950s state psychiatric hospitals reached epic populations, with about
560,000 Americans housed in long-term, state psychiatric institutions.146
While psychotherapy was embraced by outpatient clinics primarily
benefiting affluent clientele who mostly suffered from anxiety and
moderate depression, state hospitals had become warehouses filled with
patients with severe mental illnesses.147 What was so tragic about the
state hospitals during this time was how far they had departed from their
noble mission of providing humane care within an asylum.148 Current
opinions of asylums are almost uniformly negative because of what state
hospitals had become in the late 1940s and early 1950s – snake pits,149
cuckoo’s nests,150 and the shame of the states.151 Yet, if there is one
inevitable fault of human history, it is that so much of recent memory is
146. See Gronfein, supra note 12, at 437.
147. See TORREY, supra note 10, at 8-11; 91-140.
148. Perhaps one impetus to failure among institutions are mandates that result in a loss of
control by the institutions themselves. As one scholar has noted, involuntary commitments by the
courts and a safety conscious society left state asylums unable to control inflow and outflow of
patients, resulting in unmanageable growth. See Gronfein, supra note 12, at 442. Analogous to this,
one can imagine the present state of prisons in the United States and their inability to control inflow
and outflow.
149. THE SNAKE PIT (Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corporation 1948).
150. ONE FLEW OVER THE CUCKOO'S NEST (Warner Bros. 1975).
151. ALBERT DEUTSCH, THE SHAME OF THE STATES (1948).
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biased towards the recent past. The asylum was created at a time when
many people with severe mental illnesses had few places to go and
treatment of any sort was almost nil.152 The state hospital was an asylum
in the true sense: a place of refuge for the chronically ill and unwanted
who often could not care for themselves.153 What had happened to these
once venerable institutions is what happens to so many institutions and
noble ideas: time passes, demand outstrips supply, and new social
problems supplant old ones. So sadly, the state asylums had indeed
become bedlam by the 1950s: overcrowded, under-funded, and bastions
of neglect.
But that was soon to change. In the late Nineteenth Century
through the 1930s, a number of French and German scientists were
searching for new types of dyes to stain slides for microscopes. 154 These
phenothiazine dyes were noted for their various medicinal properties,
including the treatment of malaria during World War I, when the
traditional quinine treatment became unavailable due to military
embargos.155 In the 1930s, phenothiazines were explored for their
possible antihistaminic properties in an effort to discover new treatments
for surgical shock.156 After several formulations, chlorpromazine was
discovered and used in surgery by a French army surgeon named HenriMarie Lamborit.157 Lamborit noted that chlorpromazine was a highly
effective sedative and soon suggested to his psychiatric colleagues that it
be tried on their psychiatric patients. Its effect was monumental. In the
spring of 1952, a pair of French psychiatrists, Jean Delay and Pierre
Deniker, presented and published their experiences with this new
drug.158 One of their case reports was typical of how this new drug
would transform psychiatry:
Giovanni A., a 57-year-old manual worker with a long history of
mental pathology, admitted for “giving improvised political speeches,
getting into fights with strangers and walking along the street with a
152. See Aaron Rosenblatt, Concepts of the Asylum in the Care of the Mentally Ill, 35 HOSP. &
COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 244 (1984).
153. See William Vogel, A Personal Memoir of the State Hospitals of the 1950’s, 42 HOSP. &
COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 593 (1991) (claiming that the state hospitals served an important
charitable function by providing palliative care for the disenfranchised).
154. See Francisco Lopez-Munoz et al., History of the Discovery and Clinical Introduction of
Chlorpromazine, 17 ANNALS CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 113, 114 (2005) [hereinafter Clinical
Introduction of Chlorpromazine].
155. Id.
156. Id. at 116-17.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 120; Jean Delay et al., Utilisation en Therapeutique d'une Phenothiazine d'Action
Centrale Selective, 110 ANNALES MEDICO-PSYCHOLOGIQUES 112 (1952).
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plant pot on his head proclaiming his love of liberty.” After a 9-day
treatment with chlorpromazine, he was able to maintain a normal
conversation, and within 3 weeks he was in such a calm state that he
was able to be discharged.159

What Lamborit and his colleagues had discovered would become
the first successful treatment for many severe mental illnesses and would
eventually usher in a new era of biological psychiatry.
That
transformation, however, would have to overcome the stronghold of
Freud, which by the 1950s had been firmly ensconced in the United
States. Chlorpromazine would come to the Americas via Canada where
a series of studies by the psychiatrist Heinz Lehmann documented
significant improvement in two-thirds of patients given the drug.160 The
pharmaceutical giant, Smith Kline, introduced chlorpromazine in the
U.S. in 1954 under the trade name Thorazine. During that year, doctors
from McLean Hospital in Boston and Sidney Hillman Medical Center in
Philadelphia published favorable studies161 of the new drug. Soon
Thorazine was widely used in state hospitals across the country,
producing seventy-five million dollars of revenues for Smith Kline in
1955.162
The discovery and clinical application of psychotropic drugs
completely transformed psychiatry and mental illness. In 1956, a year
after Thorazine was introduced in the United States, the number of
patients at state hospitals fell for the first time since the early 1900s.163
This was a rapid reversal given that since the birth of the new century,
the census of America’s state hospitals had been massively increasing.164
The introduction of Thorazine was so monumental to psychiatry that a
prominent psychiatrist from Harvard medical school claimed one year
after its introduction that Thorazine had “totally changed psychiatric
practice.”165 Indeed, Thorazine brought science to psychiatry and
directly challenged the authority of Freud’s ideas. It did so because in
one year, Thorazine managed to do what decades of Freudian ideology
159. Clinical Introduction of Chlorpromazine, supra note 154, at 120.
160. Id. at 123-24.
161. Willis H. Bower, Chlorpromazine in Psychiatric Illness, 251 NEW ENG. J. MED. 689
(1954); N. William Winkelman, Chlorpromazine in the Treatment of Neuropsychiatric Disorders,
155 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 18 (1954).
162. Clinical Introduction of Chlorpromazine, supra note 154, at 127.
163. Id. at 129.
164. Id. In 1900, there were about 150,000 people in state psychiatric hospitals, whereas in
1955 there were about 500,000.
165. See Mark D. Altschule, Use of Chlorpromazine and Reserpine in Mental Disorders, 254
NEW ENG. J. MED. 515 (1956).
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and a century of psychiatric thought was unable to do: it brought hope to
the severely mentally ill in a manner that was manifestly obvious.166
Simultaneously, scientists also discovered and used the first
antidepressant, ipronizid, and the utility of lithium salts for manicdepression became readily apparent.167 While drug therapy was no
panacea – it was neither a cure nor a complete treatment – it made such
an appreciable impact on the symptoms of so many mental illnesses that
its force would soon be felt throughout psychiatry and the country.168
The force of drug therapy in psychiatry occurred during a time
when society was changing forcefully too. The 1960s was a period of
tremendous change and it would affect the very nature of how mental
disorders were construed, treated, and utilized by political powers. The
widespread clinical application of drug therapy was a monumental wave
that forever changed the landscape of psychiatric practice. But as often is
the case in society governed by the rule of law, the enactment of farreaching statutes had their own profound effects as well—perhaps more
so. In 1961, the Joint Commission on Mental Illness and Health
formally adopted deinstitutionalization of state hospitals as federal
policy.169 In 1963, Congress enacted the Community Mental Health
Centers Act170 which along with the enactment of Medicaid in 1965171
provided strong fiscal leverage to promote outpatient care for the
mentally ill. Medicaid provided matching fiscal dollars to the states for
proving health care to the poor and expressly excluded most inpatient
psychiatric treatment from reimbursement.172 Known as the “IMD
166. See, e.g., Gronfein, supra note 12, at 443-44 for several descriptions of utter amazement
by hospitals workers in the 1950s at the beneficial effects of Thorazine.
167. See Erik Jacobsen, The Early History of Psychotherapeutic Drugs, 89
PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 138, 141-42 (1986).
168. See generally Michael Rosenbloom, Chlorpromazine and the Psychopharmacologic
Revolution, 287 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 1860 (2002) (reporting that within eight months of Thorazine's
introduction to the United States, eight million patients had received the drug and with an efficacy
rate of seventy percent).
169. JOINT COMMISSION ON MENTAL ILLNESS AND HEALTH, ACTION FOR MENTAL HEALTH
(1961). See also, Rhoden, supra note 16, at 378 n.14 and accompanying text (discussing the
commission’s findings and recommendations related to hospitalization).
170. Community Mental Health Centers Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-164, 77 Stat. 282, 290-94
(1963).
171. Grants to States for Medical Assistance Programs, Pub. L. No. 89-97, §§ 121 et seq., 79
Stat. 343, 343-53 (1965) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396-1369(d) (2000)).
172. Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 6403(d)(2), 103 Stat. 2258, 2264 (1989) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
1396d(a)(16) & (h) (2000)). Medicaid funding for "inpatient psychiatric hospital services for
individuals under age 21" is available only for:
(A) inpatient services which are provided in an institution (or distinct part thereof) which
is a psychiatric hospital as defined in . . . this title or in another inpatient setting that the
Secretary has specified in regulations;
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exclusion” (institutional medical disease), this policy reflected a
historical distrust of federal support for state mental institutions and the
belief that such institutions were the responsibility of the states through
their parens patria powers.173 Thus, the stage had been set to provide
strong fiscal incentives for states to provide outpatient care while
providing little federal monies for continuing the inpatient asylums. The
public shock and outrage over the decrepit asylums of the late 1940s
along with the success of drugs like Thorazine served to justify these
federal policies.174
The overall effect of these forces was that the delivery of mental
health care changed dramatically. State mental hospitals opened their
backdoors and closed the front ones.175 Care for the severely mentally ill
moved from centralized state-run institutions to a hodgepodge of
community care centers that relied almost entirely on federal funding.176
Drugs such as Thorazine provided hope for those with the malignant
forms of mental illness and signaled the beginning of the drug therapy
approach for clinical treatment of mental illnesses. What soon would
become obvious to many, however, was that for the severely mentally

(B) inpatient services which, in the case of any individual (i) involved active treatment
which meets [certain specified] standards . . ., and (ii) a team, consisting of physicians
and other personnel qualified to make determinations with respect to mental health
conditions and the treatment thereof, has determined are necessary on an inpatient basis
and can reasonably be expected to improve the condition, by reason of which such
services are necessary, to the extent that eventually such services will no longer be
necessary; and
(C) inpatient services which, in the case of any individual, are provided prior to (i) the
date such individual attains age 21, or (ii) in the case of an individual who was receiving
such services in the period immediately preceding the date on which he attained age 21,
(I) the date such individual no longer requires such services, or (II) if earlier, the date
such individual attains age 22;
42 U.S.C. § 1396d(h)(1).
173. See Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 242 (1981) (Powell, J., dissenting) (citing S. Rep.
No. 404, 89th Cong. 1st Sess. pt. 1, at 20 (1965)); Joanmarie I. Davoli, No Room at the Inn: How
the Federal Medicaid Program Created Inequities in Psychiatric Hospital Access for the Indigent
Mentally Ill, 29 AM. J. L. & MED. 159, 165 (2003).
174. See Rhoden, supra note 16, at 380-81 for a description of the deplorable conditions of
state hospitals as a political factor fueling deinstitutionalization.
175. See William Gronfein, Incentives and Intentions in Mental Health Policy: A Comparison
of the Medicaid and Community Mental Health Programs, 26 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 192
(1985) (describing the influence of Medicaid on admission and discharge rates in state hospitals
during the 1950s and 1960s).
176. See TORREY supra note 10, at 91-140 (describing the proliferation of CMHC and decline
of state hospitals); Samuel Slipp, The Hospital Without Walls: An Aftercare Program for Chronic
Schizophrenic Patients, 6 GROUPS: A J. GROUP DYNAMICS & PSYCHOTHERAPY 21 (1976)
(describing the idea of a “hospital without walls” which would become a calling card for
community treatment for the severely mentally ill).
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ill, drugs alone were not curative.177 What the state hospitals had
provided for good or naught was a restricted environment that precluded
many from foregoing treatment or choosing illicit drugs instead to cope
with their symptoms.178
D. Psychiatry Under Fire
Despite the remarkable progress that psychiatry made in treating
mental illnesses in the 1950s and 1960s, it was under scrutiny by various
factions which seriously questioned its legitimacy.179 To understand
why, one must keep in mind other social conditions that occurred
concurrently. The 1960s was a time of social unrest during which
authority was openly challenged.180 The civil rights movement sought to
undermine and reorganize institutions that were perceived as
perpetuating racism.181 The Vietnam War and student protests placed
many young Americans in direct opposition to their government.182 In
sum, it was a season of upheaval and unrest. The horrors of the state
asylums were well known to the public and many critics questioned
whether psychiatry was merely a form of social control.183 Many
psychiatrists themselves questioned the traditional wisdom of psychiatric
causation and classification.184 Psychiatrists R.D. Laing185 and Theodore
Lidz186 proposed that schizophrenia was not a brain disease but a
psychological injury caused by improper parenting. Szasz and his
contemporaries would write scathing critiques of psychiatry at a time
when new psychotherapies were in fashion.187 Many of these new
therapies sought to go beyond the rigid models of Freud and
177. See, e.g., Gary R. Bond et al., Assertive Community Treatment for People with Severe
Mental Illnesses: Critical Ingredients and Impact on Patients, 9 DISEASE MANAGEMENT & HEALTH
OUTCOMES 141 (2001) (discussing the limits of psychiatric medicines and describing a
comprehensive model for community treatment).
178. Id.
179. See Mayes & Horwitz, supra note 39, at 252-54; see also Henry J. Steadman, The
Psychiatrist as a Conservative Agent of Social Control, 20 SOC. PROBS. 263 (1972).
180. See MICHAEL W. FLAMM, LAW AND ORDER: STREET CRIME, CIVIL UNREST, AND THE
CRISIS OF LIBERALISM IN THE 1960’S 64-66 (2005).
181. See Aldon D. Morris, A Retrospective on the Civil Rights Movement: Political and
Intellectual Landmarks, 25 ANN. REV. SOC. 517 (1999).
182. See FLAMM, supra note 180, at 112-13.
183. See SZASZ, supra note 1, at 12; Drammann, supra note 5, at 734-37.
184. See Szasz, supra note 20.
185. R. D. LAING, THE DIVIDED SELF: AN EXISTENTIAL STUDY IN SANITY AND MADNESS
(1965).
186. THEODORE LIDZ, SCHIZOPHRENIA AND THE FAMILY (1965).
187. See CARL ROGERS, ON BECOMING A PERSON (1961); B. F. SKINNER, ABOUT
BEHAVIORISM (1975).
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biomedicine and explained behavior as an intensely personal matter
wherein the patient was the expert of their own emotions and
behavior.188 The enormously popular philosopher Michael Foucault
proposed that mental illnesses were merely labels that allowed the
powerful to stigmatize undesirable or asocial people.189
The institution of psychiatry only further incriminated itself during
these trying times. In 1968, the American Psychiatric Association
published the Second Edition of the DSM (DSM-II).190 Whereas the
first edition had three broad categories of mental disorders, the new
edition had ten, with a total of 162 diagnoses.191 What is remarkable
about this growth was that the intervening years was not during a time
when American psychiatry was engaged in scientific experimentation
but under the influence of Freud. Since Freudian theory was just that –
theory – the proliferation of new disorders absent an empirical
foundation was astonishing. What had changed between the editions,
however, was the adoption of the Freudian paradigm and its
institutionalization into America’s social consciousness.192 So too, had it
grown in influence and power as it left the small world of severe, mental
illnesses of the state hospitals and became a ubiquitous part of American
culture.
Although psychiatry had evolved much since the 1940s, it could not
keep pace against the backdrop of social change in the 1960s and 1970s.
After several years of protest by gay activists at the American
Psychiatric Association’s annual meetings, the association’s membership
voted in 1973 to delete the contested diagnosis of homosexuality.193
Instead, beginning with the seventh printing of the DSM-II,
homosexuality would be referred to as a “sexual orientation disturbance”
and formally disposed of as a mental disorder.194 Of course, it was never
clear what separated a disturbance from a disorder, just as it was not
entirely clear what differentiated a mental disorder from a mental illness
or mental disease. What is obvious in hindsight was that the DSM was
188. See Carl R. Rogers, The Concept of the Fully Functioning Person, 16 PASTORAL
PSYCHOL. 21 (1965) (discussing his therapeutic vision of client-centered therapy).
189. MICHEL FOUCAULT, MADNESS AND CIVILIZATION: A HISTORY OF INSANITY IN THE AGE
OF REASON (1961).
190. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL FOR
MENTAL DISORDERS (2nd ed., 1968) [hereinafter DSM –II].
191. Id.
192. See TORREY, supra note 51.
193. See Mayes & Horwitz, supra note 39, at 258-59; see also George Mendelson,
Homosexuality and Psychiatric Nosology, 37 AUSTRALIAN & NEW ZEAL & J. PSYCHIATRY 678
(2003) (describing the historical background of homosexuality’s classification as a mental disorder).
194. Id.
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on a progressive trajectory of broadening the rubric of its classification
scheme to include behaviors that had little, if any, biological basis in a
disease model of medicine. Additionally, the deletion of homosexuality
from the DSM indicated that psychiatry was susceptible to political
forces which could successfully abolish a mental disorder that had
existed for centuries. Irrespective of the ethical implications of
classifying homosexuality as a mental disorder, the psychiatric
association had erased a supposedly scientific diagnosis by the stroke of
a pen.195 In a Szaszian time, this action would haunt psychiatry for years
and lend creditability to its mounting critics.
The courts also played a role in psychiatry’s tribulation. During the
1960s and 1970s a number of seminal court decisions radically changed
the balance of power between professional psychiatric judgment and
patient autonomy. These decisions mirrored the shifting cultural and
institutional views on behavior, morality, and authority. In 1962, the
Supreme Court decided Robinson v. California, holding unconstitutional
a California statute criminalizing addiction.196 Soon there was much
discussion about whether all conduct putatively derived from addiction –
including possession and theft – should be held unconstitutional on
Eighth Amendment grounds.197 In 1972, the Eastern District of
Wisconsin decided Lessard v. Schmidt,198 a watershed case in psychiatric
civil commitment. In Lessard, the District Court held most of
Wisconsin’s civil commitment statute unconstitutional.199 Wisconsin’s
civil commitment statute was typical of the time with vague commitment
criteria, few requirements for formal hearings, and generally few patient
protections.200 The Lessard decision was considered a warning shot by
most of the states and soon commitment statutes nationwide were
substantively changed with the net effect that commitment became more
difficult and inpatient stays much shorter.201 Following numerous other
cases,202 it became clear by the late 1970s that psychiatry was in crisis.203
195. See EDWARD SHORTER, A HISTORY OF PSYCHIATRY: FROM THE ERA OF THE ASYLUM TO
AGE OF PROZAC 313 (1998) (“[W]hat had been considered for a century or more a grave
psychiatric disorder ceased to exist.”).
196. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
197. See Herbert Fingarette, Addiction and Criminal Responsibility, 84 YALE L. J. 413, 414-15
(1975) (discussing various court decisions and commentators proposing to extend Robinson).
198. Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (1972).
199. Id. at 1103.
200. See Steven K. Erickson et al., Beyond Overt Violence: Wisconsin's Progressive Civil
Commitment Statute as a Marker of a New Era in Mental Health Law, 89 MARQ. L. REV. 359, 36264 (2005) (discussing the statute, the Lessard decision, and the reformed statute post-Lessard).
201. Id. at 365-69.
202. See, e.g., Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (holding that insanity
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E. Redemption Through Biology
It is often the case that, through a confluence of factors, an
institution can be fundamentally transformed. Such was the case for
psychiatry in the 1980s. After two decades of ridicule, a new
formulation of psychiatry was ready to sweep through the field that
would eventually change every facet of its nature. During the 1970s
when psychiatry was in peril, a number of psychiatrists at Washington
University in St. Louis and the New York State Psychiatric Institute in
Syracuse began the clarion call for biological psychiatry.204 The
biological psychiatrists started their mission by sweeping aside the
discredited formulations of Freud, favoring instead a return to Emil
Kraepelin, the early pioneer who sought to classify mental illnesses
based on symptoms instead of a presumption of human nature.205 As
drug therapies were refined and new technologies, such as brain
imaging, introduced novel methods of examining the brains of the
severely mentally ill, biological psychiatry offered the legitimacy of
science to a battered profession.206 In 1980, the American Psychiatric
Association published its Third Edition of the DSM (DSM-III).207 But
this was no mere update of the venerable book. The DSM-III discarded
its Freudian conceptions in favor of the Kraepelin model of symptom
clustering.208 Whereas previous editions had included a “neurosis”
category that originated from the precepts of Freud, the DSM-III favored
acquittees have a constitutional right to treatment); O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975)
(requiring the criteria of mental illness and dangerousness for involuntary commitments);
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979) (holding that clear and convincing must be the standard of
proof for involuntary civil commitments).
203. See Mayes & Horwitz, supra note 39, at 252-54 (describing the “crisis of legitimacy in
psychiatry circa 1970.”).
204. See ROGER K. BLASHFIELD, THE CLASSIFICATION OF PSYCHOPATHOLOGY: NEOKRAEPELINIAN AND QUANTITATIVE APPROACHES (1994).
205. Samuel H. Barondes, The Biological Approach to Psychiatry: History and Prospects, 10
J. NEUROSCIENCE 1707 (1990) (describing the flaws of Freud’s ideas and the rise of biological
psychiatry); Wilson M. Compton & Samuel B. Guze, The Neo-Kraepelinian Revolution in
Psychiatric Diagnosis, 245 EUR. ARCHIVES PSYCHIATRY & CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCE 196 (1995)
(describing the ebb and flow of Kraeplin’s influence in psychiatry and his principles of diagnostic
classification).
206. See Rogler, supra note 39, at 11 (discussing the problems of psychodynamic formulations
that “represented the interposing of unverified assumptions of causality into the diagnostic function”
and the “evocative” nature of DSM-I and DSM-II because the definitions contained therein were
presented with the assumption of knowledge about them); Mayes & Horwitz, supra note 39, at 25866 (discussing how DSM-III and biological psychiatry was a response to the crisis of legitimacy in
psychiatry).
207. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS (3rd ed. 1980) [hereinafter DSM-III].
208. Id.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2008

41

Akron Law Review, Vol. 41 [2008], Iss. 1, Art. 8
ERICKSON_FINAL

108

1/25/2008 10:30:55 AM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[41:67

a multi-tiered “axis” that purportedly grouped various mental disorders
according to common symptoms and possibly underlying pathology.209
What did not change, however, was its appetite for growth. The
DSM-III was almost 500 pages in length with 265 diagnoses – a growth
of over fifty percent from the DSM-II.210 Included in this panoply of
disorders was an entire section of “personality disorders” that previously
had not enjoyed categorical prominence.211 Under prior formulations of
the DSM, personality was enmeshed within the theoretical framework of
neurosis. With the advent of the DSM-III, which claimed not to be
associated with any particular theoretical lens,212 personality disorders
were presented as a scientific reality.213 Moreover, the presence of such
personality disorders, like all diagnoses in the DSM, was based upon a
dichotomous categorization of present or absent.214 That is, a person
was deemed disordered when they met a core number of symptoms –
perhaps 3 out of 5, or 5 out of 7. Thus, diagnosis was based entirely
upon behavior – observed and reported – and not on laboratory tests.215
While the absence of diagnostic tests was nothing new in psychiatry
(there still exists no single laboratory test for any mental disorder),216 the
absence of a theoretical underpinning for such disorders as “antisocial
personality disorder” or “narcissistic personality disorder” begs the
209. See Mayes & Horwitz, supra note 39, at 261-63 (discussing the deletion of neurosis from
the DSM).
210. Id. at 251.
211. See W. John Livesley et al., Categorical Distinctions in the Study of Personality
Disorder: Implications for Classification, 103 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 6, 7; 12-14 (1994).
212. See Follette, supra note 145, at 1122-23 (discussing the “atheoretical” nature of DSM-III).
213. There has been much discussion regarding the charge that the DSM has “invented” mental
disorders without empirical support. Compare Jerome C. Wakefield, The Myth of DSM's Invention
of New Categories of Disorder: Houts Diagnostic Discontinuity Thesis Disconfirmed, 39
BEHAVIOUR RES. & THERAPY 575 (2001) with Arthur C. Houts, The Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual's New White Coat and Circularity of Plausible Dysfunctions: Response to Wakefield Part 1,
39 BEHAVIOUR RES. & THERAPY 575 (2001) and Nick Manning, Psychiatric Diagnosis Under
Conditions of Uncertainty: Personality Disorder, Science, and Professional Legitimacy, 22 SOC.
HEALTH & ILLNESS 621 (2000).
214. See Thomas A. Widiger, The DSM-III-R Categorical Personality Disorder Diagnoses: A
Critique and an Alternative, 4 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 75 (1993) (discussing the categorical nature of
diagnosis in the DSM).
215. See Office of the Surgeon General, Mental Health: Report of the Surgeon General, United
States
Department
of
Health
and
Human
Services,
available
at
http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/mentalhealth/chapter2/sec2.html (visited Apr. 10, 2006)
("The diagnosis of mental disorders is often believed to be more difficult than diagnosis of somatic,
or general medical, disorders, since there is no definitive lesion, laboratory test, or abnormality in
brain tissue that can identify the illness. The diagnosis of mental disorders must rest with the
patients’ reports of the intensity and duration of symptoms, signs from their mental status
examination, and clinician observation of their behavior including functional impairment.”).
216. Id.
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question: how are these disorders of personality formulated and what
makes them disorders?217
Nonetheless, the DSM-III was congruent with biological
psychiatry’s view of human behavior as a verifiable and empirical
enterprise of the brain.218 It also returned psychiatry to the field of
medicine by presupposing that mental disorders were discoverable by
the scientific method.219 And biological psychiatry, aided by the
emergence of molecular biology and genetics in the late 1980s and
1990s, delivered results.220 Soon, scientific journals were inundated
with studies reporting variations and abnormalities of various
physiological processes in persons with DSM disorders. A common
presumption that became doctrine held that any physiological
abnormality associated with a DSM diagnosis was evidence of the
pathological process occurring in the brain. The mantra in science that
“correlation does not equate causation” was always proclaimed, but in a
scientific world were everything is correlation and nothing entirely
proven, this cautionary statement meant little.221
III. THE MYTH OF MENTAL DISORDER
When Szasz wrote the Myth of Mental Illness in 1961 he directly
challenged psychiatry’s legitimacy during a time when Freudian ideas
dominated the understanding of human behavior and there were few
biological explanations for abnormal conduct.222 Much has changed
since then, yet Szasz remains steadfast.223 One striking criticism that
217. See Widiger, supra note 214, at 76 (“In fact, there was no empirical support for the
threshold of 9 of the 11 personality disorders diagnoses. They were based simply on the expert
consensus.”).
218. See, e.g., Andreasen, supra note 89, and accompanying text.
219. For a general overview, see Eric R. Kandel, A New Intellectual Framework for
Psychiatry, 155 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 457 (1998).
220. Id.
221. Surely this premise is true in all of science insofar as scientific laws are never absolute in
that causation is imputed when hypotheses are tested through experiments and reproducible
observations are produced repeatedly over time. Then theory becomes scientific law. What is
different in psychiatry is that science knows so little about the brain and even less about the mind.
222. See Douglas Mossman, Unbuckling the "Chemical Straitjacket:" The Legal Significance
of Recent Advances in the Pharmacological Treatment of Psychosis, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1033,
1047-59 (2002) (reviewing the advances in the biological explanations of mental illnesses).
223. Compare Robert Michels, Szasz Under Fire: The Psychiatric Abolitionist Faces His
Critics, 352 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1273, 1273 (2005) (reviewing Szasz’s new book: “[t]his book, some
60 years later, continues that attack [on psychiatry].”), and Thomas Szasz, Psychiatric Fraud and
Force: A Critique of E. Fuller Torrey, 44 J. HUMANISTIC PSYCHOL. 416 (2004) (disputing the
biological psychiatry proponents), with E. Fuller Torrey, Psychiatric Fraud and Force: A Reply to
Szasz, 45 J. HUMANISTIC PSYCHOL. 397, 401 (2005) (“[i]n 2004, in light of current research, his
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Szasz set forth was the failed attempts to discover physical markers of
mental illnesses and what that meant for psychiatry’s legitimacy as a
science.224 To Szasz, psychiatry’s talk about mental disorders made no
sense because psychiatry held the supposition that behaviors were
manifestations of the brain, hence, physical enterprises of the brain.225 If
there was such a thing as mental illnesses under this view, then a
biological aliment – an identifiable lesion located in the brain – was a
necessary component.226 Yet, science had failed to discover such lesions
for most mental illnesses. Moreover, if such a lesion existed, then
mental illnesses were in fact physical diseases of the brain, not mental
disorders of the metaphysical mind. Curiously, those illnesses with
known physical lesions or abnormalities that cause psychiatric behavior
are rarely treated by psychiatry. Parkinson’s disease, Alzheimer’s
disease, porphyria, endocrine disorders – all are treated by other medical
disciplines yet have key psychiatric components. Psychiatry seems to
flourish in the domain of presumed biological illnesses that are
conceptually tied to behaviors. This rather subjective proposition has
lent critics, including Szasz, much fodder over the years, but are they
right?
An important question to pose relates to the definition of disease.
A common view in science is that a disease relates to a pathological
process that in some manner robs an organism of its normal
functioning.227 Thus, one can deduce that the organism in question has
the propensity for a healthy state and, if properly treated, will be restored
to that normal state. In looking at Blackstone’s “madmen”228 or the
“wild beast,”229 what comes to mind are the psychotic disorders of DSM.
That is, those people so afflicted with madness or insanity that their very
unchanging views appear as an anachronism and allow critics to discard his entire corpus of work,
much of which is still valuable. An inability to change one’s thinking when confronted with
markedly changing data is not a virtue.”).
224. See Thomas Szasz, What Counts as Disease? The Gold Standard of Disease Versus the
Fiat Standard of Diagnosis, 10 THE INDEP. REV. 325, 327 (2005).
225. See Drammann, supra note 5, at 736.
226. Szasz, supra note 224.
227. Granted, there are many definitions of disease and much controversy surrounding them.
See Caroline Whitbeck, Causation in Medicine: The Disease Entity Model, 44 PHIL. SCI. 619, 62225 (1977) (reviewing entities [pathogens] as causation of disease). Nonetheless, the notion of
pathogen and disease is strongly linked in medical history. See Robert Kock, Uber die Atiologie der
Tuberkulose, in VERHANDLUNGEN DES KONGRESSES FUR INNERE MEDIZIN (1882) (describing his
seminal Koch Postulates); cf. with STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 492 (26th ed. 1995)
(“Disease: An interruption, cessation, or disorder of body functions, systems, or organs.”).
228. See Blackstone, supra note 22.
229. See Rex v. Arnold, 16 How. St. Tr. 695, 764-65 (1724); supra note 22, and accompanying
text.
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personhood is degraded or destroyed. There is no consideration that
these people, in their ideal state, would in fact be insane.230 That is, if
properly treated, they would resume their full identity which does not
include the pathogenic process. Consequently, their essence as a person
exists beyond insanity. Contrast this view with temperament or
personality whereby any “illness” or “disorder” is typically viewed as
intimately enmeshed with the personhood of the actor.231 Separating the
supposed illness from the person seems difficult if not impossible; the
illness is easily subsumed into the personal identity of the afflicted. It
may be that such ill-tempered people deserve pity but it is hardly the
case that they are viewed as affected by a pathogenic disease process.232
Yet, in the current DSM, these two groups – the psychotic and the
personality defective – are both under the rubric of mental disorder.233
What this means of course is that psychiatry has silently enmeshed
the two together and engages in a back and forth whereby the psychotic
person is considered afflicted with psychosis that is pervasive in their
personhood and the personality disordered person is imbued with disease
of his temperament. Yet neither is true. Untreated psychosis can surely
have enduring and broad effects on a person.234 Moreover, psychotic
disorders like schizophrenia are indeed chronic, life altering illnesses.235
But any reasonable clinician will tell you that psychosis neither
intertwines with personality nor dominates it. That is, a person with
schizophrenia retains her personhood after the onset of the illness and
between periods when she becomes psychotic. A person who believes,
despite compelling evidence to the contrary, that he is the President of
the United States and Jesus Christ simultaneously for a few weeks and
then rejects that belief after receiving a medicine that is known to affect
230. When I say ideal I mean if it were possible to “cure” or remove entirely the disease.
Sadly though, treatment of psychotic illnesses rarely achieves full remission. See, Sharma &
Antonova, supra note, 58.
231. See, e.g., DSM-IV-TR, supra note 37, at 685 (“A personality disorder is an enduring
pattern of inner experience and behavior.”).
232. Not in any traditional sense of causation. Personality and disease may be linked insofar as
personality types may be associated with risk of certain diseases, but there is no creditable evidence
that personality disorders themselves are caused by pathogens. See generally HOWARD S.
FRIEDMAN, PERSONALITY AND DISEASE (1990).
233. See DSM-IV-TR, supra note 37.
234. See Srinivasan T. Tirupati et al., Psychopathology in Never-Treated Schizophrenia, 47
COMPREHENSIVE PSYCHIATRY 1 (2006) (reporting widespread and disabling psychopathology in an
untreated group of subjects with schizophrenia without any history of treatment).
235. See DSM-IV-TR, supra note 37, at 309 (“Complete remission [of schizophrenia] is
probably not common in this disorder.”); Kim T Mueser & Susan R. McGurk, Schizophrenia, 363
THE LANCET 2063, 2063; 2066 (2004) (reporting lifelong impairment with schizophrenia as one of
the world’s top ten causes of disability).
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the brain, is evidently afflicted with a disease despite an absence of a
lesion. It is the profound distortion of reality and its direct response to
medication that has a restorative propensity which suggests so. This
“obviously mentally ill”236 person is not engaged in an alternative
speculation about the meaning of life when his behaviors fail the test of
intentionality237 so clearly and to his detriment.238 Couple this with the
compelling research that demonstrates multiple and substantial
abnormalities in the brains of persons with these illnesses and it becomes
apparent that psychoses are brain diseases.239 Now, returning to Szasz’s
charge of the mental and physical duality – it seems that the term mental
is useful only insofar as it relates to a disturbance of behavior. As
Nancy Andreasen points out, separating the mind and brain is only
useful in abstract discussion since in reality they cannot be divorced
from one another.240 Therefore, a physical disease can affect the mind,
but there will never be any marker for mental phenomena because the
markers we are interested in are physical ones. That does not mean,
however, that mental illnesses do not exist. What it does mean is that
evidence of a disease in the brain is necessary to give legitimacy to any
claim of a mental impairment. Moreover, merely finding some brain
abnormalities in the brain of a group of subjects is not tantamount to a
disease, as is the case in emerging research on psychopathic
personality.241 Simply put, psychiatry needs to clearly state which
mental illnesses are likely brain diseases and which are emotional
difficulties and discard the disingenuous term of “disorder.” It is not

236. See Treffert, supra note 17.
237. See Bolton, supra note 21, at 185-87 for a discussion of intentionality and mental illness.
See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
238. There is a wealth of research that suggests that schizophrenia is associated with an overall
poor life course. See, HIRSCH & WEINBERGER, supra note 53, at 101-41; Thomas H. Jobe & Martin
Harrow, Long-Term Outcome of Patients with Schizophrenia, 50 CANADIAN J. PSYCHIATRY 892
(2005) (reporting overall poor outcomes including increased risk of suicide and early death).
239. There have been numerous studies that have documented structural and functional brain
abnormalities in schizophrenia and bipolar illness. See Pantelis, supra note 53; Stephen M.
Strakowski, The Functional Neuroanatomy of Bipolar Disorder: A Review of Neuroimaging
Findings, 10 MOLECULAR PSYCHIATRY 105 (2005); Paul M. Thompson et al., Mapping Adolescent
Brain Change Reveals Dynamic Wave of Accelerated Gray Matter Loss in Very Early-Onset
Schizophrenia, 98 PROC. OF THE NAT'L ACAD. OF SCI.S 11650 (2001).
240. Andreasen, supra note 89.
241. For instance, there have been finings that psychopaths have abnormal brain activity. See
JAMES BLAIR ET AL., THE PSYCHOPATH: EMOTION AND THE BRAIN 81-95 (2005) (reviewing brainimaging findings in psychopathy). While the evidence is preliminary, there is some evidence
suggesting that psychopaths have difficulty in emotion processing and impulsivity. At first blush, I
cannot see how this could led to criminal exculpation, but see Morse, supra note 67, at 264
(discussing the necessity of emotional in moral and legal culpability).
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that psychiatry should abandon any efforts to understand or even treat
emotional difficulties, but claiming that “antisocial personality
disorder”242 and schizophrenia243 are both “mental disorders” appears
faulty and disingenuous.
But does any of this matter? It does in terms of giving psychiatric
illnesses like schizophrenia their due recognition by medicine,
philosophers, and the politicians.244 It also matters in terms of correcting
the popular misconceptions about psychiatric illness and behavior.245
Our culture has unconsciously assumed that many behaviors are caused
by something awry in the brain. This has led many into the belief that
they are hopeless to overcome their biological propensities without the
aid of professional mental health. But also it matters to the law; or to put
it differently, it matters if one wants to prevent the perversion that
science and law can visit upon each other. The sections below will
hopefully demonstrate that vice.
A. Disorder By Any Other Name
The Fourth Edition of the DSM (DSM-IV)246 in 1994 and its “text
revision” in 2000 (DSM-IV-TR),247 the current version, continued the
new descriptive approach embraced by DSM-III. Presently, the DSM
contains 297 diagnoses in 886 pages.248 Thus, in the forty-two short
years since its inception, the DSM diagnoses have ballooned by almost
300% and the book itself has increased by 800% in length. More
importantly, however, is that the core mental illnesses that concerned
Benjamin Rush’s seminal treatise – the severe mental illnesses:
schizophrenia and manic-depression – are essentially the same.249 What
242. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 37, at 701.
243. Id. at 298.
244. There has been much written on whether mental health parity laws should be passed.
Much of this issue hinges on whether mental illnesses are construed on par with physical diseases.
See generally John K. Iglehart, The Mental Health Maze and the Call for Transformation, 350 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 507 (2004).
245. This can be seen mostly prominently in how our culture (aided by science) views
addiction and sexual paraphilias. See, e.g., Molly M. Warthan, Tatsuo Uchida, & Richard F.
Wagner, UV Light Tanning as a Type of Substance-Related Disorder, 141 ARCHIVES
DERMATOLOGY 963 (2005); Lynne Lamberg, Researchers Seek Roots of Pedophilia, 294 J. AM.
MED. ASS'N 546, 547 (2005) (describing research examining similarities between heroin addiction
and pedophilia).
246. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM-IV].
247. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 37.
248. Mayes & Horwitz, supra note 39, at 251.
249. See Compton, supra note 205, at 197-98.
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has changed is the veritable explosion of disorders that have little
connection with disease as traditionally understood or are not really
biological in nature. In the present DSM there are a total of nine
psychotic disorders. Psychosis includes mental illnesses whereby a
person loses contact with reality and often experiences periods of
hallucinations and delusions.250 Schizophrenia is the most common
psychotic disorder with a prevalence rate in the United States of about
one percent of the general population.251 Compare this with the
seventeen listed sexual disorders,252 which as discussed previously, have
undergone a turbulent past. Included in this vast array of sexual
disorders are: Exhibitionism, Pedophilia, Transvestic Fetishism, Gender
Identity Disorder,253 and Sexual Sadism among others. These disorders
exist despite little to no empirical evidence of any underlying disease
process that could account for their existence.254 Pedophilia, an immoral
act, is a mental disorder not because of some mental degeneration of the
brain but because such behavior is socially construed to be a process of a
sick mind.255 Thus, it is a modern incantation of Pritchard’s moral
insanity without the presumption of lack of self-governance (or negation
of mens rea I suppose).256 One can surmise that in spite of biological
psychiatry’s force during the past twenty-five years, sex and mental
capacity are forever entwined.
And what about the numerous personality disorders? The DSM-III
created an entirely new section for personality disorders that had not
been included in previous editions. Personality disorders are generally
pervasive and insidious flaws of what has historically been conceived of
as temperament, habit, or breeding. Thus, the current edition of DSM
contains a diagnosis of “antisocial personality disorder”257 that
250. See HAROLD I. KAPLAN & BENJAMIN J. SADOCK, KAPLAN AND SADOCK'S SYNOPSIS OF
PSYCHIATRY: BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES, CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 492 (1998).
251. See DSM-IV supra note 246.
252. Kaplan, supra note 250, at 539-82.
253. There is much scientific and political debate about the biological role of gender. Despite
the paucity of definitive science on the matter, some view gender as a personal choice while the
DSM says that it can be a mental disorder. Compare DSM-IV-TR, supra note 37, at 576 with
Patricia L. Brown, Supporting Boys or Girls When the Line Isn't Clear, N. Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2006,
at A1.
254. A cross-search in the PSYCHINFO database of the terms “pedophilia” and “biology”
resulted in only four hits, none of which suggest a biological explanation; likewise, “neurobiology”
and “paraphilias” produced seven with no biological explanations. American Psychological
Association, APA PsycNET, http://psycnet.apa.org/ (last visited: Apr. 10, 2006).
255. See generally Richard Green, Is Pedophilia a Mental Disorder?, 31 ARCHIVES SEXUAL
BEHAV. 467 (2002).
256. See PRICHARD, supra note 98.
257. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 37, at 701-06.
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essentially defines a habitual rule-breaker as “mentally disordered” and
presumably in need of psychiatric treatment (despite their being little, if
any, successful treatment available).258 While personality features were
considered relevant to pre-DSM-III clinicians, their elevation as a
separate category of illness represented a “medicalization” of behavior
that was previously considered inseparable from personal identity.259
This seemingly slight change has a profound premise and conclusion. If
one’s predilection for asocial behavior is a mental disorder rather than
the outcome of personal choice, then questions surrounding legal and
social culpability are prominently introduced into the mix, but in a
manner that is foreign to traditional criminal law. The asocial behavior
centers not on choice of the free agent who presumably could have been
dissuaded by the deterrent effects of criminal sanctions. Rather, the
behavior is indicative of a diseased mind that requires a plethora of
mental health interventions. The agent, moreover, is presumed to lack
robust responsiveness to traditional criminal sanctions including
deterrence and retribution, leaving only incapacitation. While many
scholars condemn retribution as an outmoded and harsh method of
criminal justice, the de facto imprisonment of sex offenders under the
numerous sexually violent predator statutes is accomplished under the
incapacitation rubric. But calculated incapacitation is a sword that cuts
both ways. Incapacitation removes the moral condemnation in place of a
diseased model, and hence, the proportionality of punishment is also
replaced by a public safety model. Of course, the question then
becomes, would a sex offender ever be deemed safe enough for release
into the community? In this way, the transformation of immoral conduct
into diseased behavior becomes dangerous since the morality of just
punishment is silently removed in favor of a purely risk assessment
process. Yet as many scholars have demonstrated, humans are very poor
at judging risk.260
This is not to suggest that those who habitually engage in one
behavior over another cannot gain insight from psychotherapy or that
undesirable behavior is incapable of being changed through mental

258. See William H. Reid & Carl Gacono, Treatment of Antisocial Personality, Psychopathy,
and other Characterological Antisocial Syndromes, 18 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 647, 658 (2000)
(concluding "[n]o traditional voluntary or inpatient milieu has been shown to be effective, and there
is no individual or group psychotherapy that is routinely associated with success.").
259. See generally JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING (1689)
(discussing personal identity and consciousness).
260. See W. KIP VISCUSI, SMOKE-FILLED ROOMS: A POSTMORTEM ON THE TOBACCO DEAL
136-75 (2002).
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health programs.261 Rather, it is the crossing of the important but
nebulous line between medical illness and personal identity that is
troublesome. By calling personality flaws illnesses, the role of personal
choice and moral accountability are undermined. Furthermore, in areas
where science has not shown there to be any disease process causing the
behavior, questions of normality become entirely socially constructed,
and hence, venerable to manipulation by the politically powerful. The
term disorder is inherently meaningless since it has no scientific
grounding. Thus, psychiatry is free to subsume more behaviors under
this confutable classification scheme which engenders the profession
more power in culture and law. The proliferation of mental disorders is
an accretion of power with valence in every domain of life. Under the
nosology of mental disorder, there is little that cannot be deemed a
psychiatric condition.
Life is full of problems. This is a truism of all people from all
generations. In dealing with emotional problems or brain diseases it is
helpful to understand the problems that influence a person’s suffering.
However, the DSM interjects a number of disorders or descriptors that
are neither illnesses nor sicknesses. Illicit drug abuse is a horrendous
social and political problem that destroys many families, neighborhoods,
and a good deal of many fine people. Taking drugs like cocaine
undoubtedly changes the physiology of the brain,262 yet there is no
disease because there is no pathogen. The drug itself cannot be the
pathogen because it is not a reproducing organism such as a virus or
bacteria. An animal that voluntarily and knowing ingests a drug that
will harm itself cannot be suffering from a disease unless we are willing
to claim that ill-advised, intentional behavior is the product of disease.
A brain disease is so because of a presumed pathogenic process
harmonious with established laws of science.263 Irrespective of whether
such pathology is definitively identified, it leaves in its wake immutable
signs of its presence, none of which includes a conscious undertaking by
the host to induce more pathology.
Likewise, when the DSM identifies numerous medical conditions
under its purview that only tangentially relate to the brain, the questions

261. Indeed, I believe as a psychologist myself that many of life’s problems can be helped
through psychotherapy. But it is one think to say that one’s problems or penchants could benefit
from therapy and quite another to say or imply that they are mental diseases.
262. See generally B. Jill Venton et. al., Cocaine Increases Dopamine Release by Mobilization
of Synapsin-Dependant Reverse Pool, 26 THE J. NEUROSCIENCE 3206 (2006).
263. See generally Koch, supra note 227; Sally Satel & Scott Lilienfeld, Medical Misnomer:
Addiction Isn’t A Brain Disease, SLATE, July 25, 2007, http://www.slate.com/id/2171131/.
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begs: what purpose does this serve? Thus, the “mental disorder” of
“Breathing-Related Sleep Disorder”264 (otherwise known as sleep apnea)
or “Sexual Dysfunction Due to a Medical Condition”265 are illegitimate
to psychiatry not because they are inconsequential to the emotions or
functioning of a person, but because they are neither brain diseases nor
principally curative under psychiatric practice.266
Similarly,
“Hypoactive Sexual Desire Disorder”267 is fraudulent because by failing
to identify its medical origin, psychiatry inculcates a mental singularity
when in fact it is apt to be entirely biological. Such methods serve only
to confabulate sickness with mental phenomena by placing life’s
problems and aspects of medical diseases into a fictional mental domain
that ostensibly is the exclusive authority of psychiatry.
B. A Road to Perdition
As is probably clear in this Article, Freud’s influence in psychiatry
and its classification of mental illnesses had many profound effects
during the 1940s through the 1970s. As was discussed in Part I and Part
II, what was curious and disturbing was that Freud’s ideas were largely
theoretical in a field that represented itself as science. As such,
psychiatric thought was asserted instead of proven. Nonetheless, there is
something to be said about a theoretical outlook on behavior. When the
DSM-III was published, there was much outcry from the psychoanalysts
who contested the deletion of “neurosis” from the diagnostic manual.268
The DSM-II was essentially divided between psychotic illnesses and the
neuroses.269 Neurosis was conceived by Freud and psychoanalysts as an
imbalance in the mind due to the conflict between the id and superego
that the ego tried to resolve through various defense mechanisms, but
wherein rational thought was preserved.270 There are many problems
with this notion of mind, the first of which is that who is to say that there
is anything such as the id, ego, or superego? Notwithstanding, the
benefit of this view in the DSM-II was a sense that not all mental
264. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 37, at 622.
265. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 37, at 558-61.
266. For instance, a pituitary adenoma could produce sexual dysfunction, but psychiatrists do
not treat this illness, endocrinologists do. See EUGENE BRAUNWALD ET AL., HARRISON'S
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNAL MEDICINE 2033 (15th ed. 2001).
267. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 37, at 539.
268. See Ronald Bayer & Robert L. Spitzer, Neurosis, Psychodynamics, and DSM-III. A
History of Controversy, 42 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 187 (1985).
269. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL FOR
MENTAL DISORDERS (2nd ed. 1968).
270. See SIGMUND FREUD, THE EGO AND THE ID 9 (1923).
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problems were the same. That is, there were the psychoses which were
thought of as severe breaks of the mind from reality and then there were
the neuroses which were, in many ways, life’s problems. Thus, it was a
common view among the Freudians that all people encountered neurosis
sometime in their lives and that part of life’s work was to toil through
them.271
In departing from this idea, the DSM-III essentially
transformed all behaviors in the diagnostic manual into illnesses. In so
doing, they not only changed social perception of personality flaws from
difficulties to illness, but also changed how institutions used these
epistemological views.
It has often been said that what makes law different is the force of
law.272 Law is in a unique position to back up its assertions with
sanctions. Thus, when the law borrows ideas from other disciplines, it
has the capability to enforce those ideas throughout society. Moreover,
law does not necessarily need to follow a pursuit of truth in the same
manner that science does. In that vein, law has more to do with politics
and seeking those ends than with conceptual validity. That is, justice is
determined by what political actors decree it is, not by some lofty quest
to resolve theory and practice. In terms of behavior, the expansion of
“madness”273 into the pantheon of the current DSM has epitomized this
danger of the interplay between law and psychiatry.
As an illustrative example, take the antisocial personality disorder.
In Foucha v. Louisiana,274 the United States Supreme Court held that the
state could not involuntarily hold a psychiatric patient adjudicated not
guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI) who no longer is suffering from a
mental illness. Mr. Foucha’s retention was sought because although he
was no longer psychotic, his future dangerousness was uncertain because
of his antisocial traits. The Court held that such detention was unlawful
because Foucha was no longer mentally ill and dangerous.275 Citing its
decision in O’Connor v. Donaldson,276 the Court noted that mental
illness is required for involuntary psychiatric commitment.277 Since
Foucha’s antisocial traits were not an official diagnosis, his detention
was predicated on possible future dangerousness.278 In contrast, in U.S.

271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.

See OTTO FENICHEL, THE PSYCHOANALYTICAL THEORY OF NEUROSIS (1999).
See MAX WEBER, POLITICS AS A VOCATION (1919).
See Blackstone, supra note 22, and accompanying text.
Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 77 (1992).
Id.
O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
Foucha, 504 U.S. at 77.
Id. at 78.
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v. Jackson,279 the Fifth Circuit held it permissible to continue the
commitment of an NGRI whose schizophrenia was in remission because
his diagnosed Antisocial Personality Disorder rendered him
dangerous.280 Likewise, in a North Carolina case, the Court of Appeals
for Northern Carolina upheld the continued confinement of an NGRI
patient with a history of a brief psychotic episode, substance abuse, and
antisocial “traits.”281 Drawing upon the inclusion of personality
disorders in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
as well as expert testimony that such disorders are lifelong afflictions,
the Court held that the defendant was mentally ill and dangerous within
the ambit of the statute.282 And there is, of course, the well-known
Kansas v. Hendricks283 case whereby the United States Supreme Court
held that there was no violation of Hendricks’s Constitutional rights
when Kansas committed him for psychiatric treatment for pedophilia
after his serving his criminal sentence. What can we deduce from these
apparently incongruous results? Much has been written about the
Hendricks case and I will not delve into the many legal controversies
surrounding that case in this article. What I think is relevant, though, for
this article is that while many mental health professionals have decried
the Hendricks case, it was inevitable because the legacy of the DSM and
psychiatry has been to subsume more and more behaviors under the
broad rubric of “mental disorder.” It is true that sexual psychopaths
have routinely been civilly committed in the country,284 but in an age of
biological psychiatry the inclusion of pedophilia or the myriad of other
“disorders” that have absolutely no foundation in a biologically-rooted,
disease model discipline is a road that invites treachery. The law should
not so blatantly abuse science to achieve politically desired, albeit
understandable, results (in this case lifelong incapacitation). Likewise,
psychiatry should not engage in such falsehoods as much of the DSM
does.

279. U.S. v. Jackson, 19 F.3d 1003 (5th Cir. 1994).
280. Id. at 1007 (upholding the district court’s finding of dangerousness “because the evidence
shows that his current dangerousness stems from an antisocial personality rather than schizophrenia
and that he can be held legally only if his violent behavior is ‘due to a present mental disease or
defect’.”).
281. In re Hayes, 532 S.E.2d 553 (2000).
282. “[A]ssuming arguendo that Hayes is neither psychotic nor drug or alcohol dependent, he
may still be found ‘mentally ill’ by virtue of having been diagnosed with a personality disorder.” Id.
at 558.
283. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 372 (1997) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
284. See Edwin H. Sutherland, The Sexual Psychopath Laws, 40 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
543 (1950).
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IV. CONCLUSION: REFORM AND INSTITUTIONAL INERTIA
As I have presented, there is much to be concerned about the road
that psychiatry is on. This is no mere intellectual debate for mental
health professionals since how behavior is explained and excused has
profound social and legal consequences. Herbert Fingarette’s prescient
conclusion in his Yale Law Journal article thirty years ago that legal
conclusions regarding behavior are quite apart from social or humane
ones was an astute observation.285 The reform that the DSM needs must
begin with an honest self-evaluation by psychiatry. If it is a science,
then it must embrace the scientific principles and diagnose illnesses by
virtue of their characteristics as disease. While it is an axiom that
behavior and mental illness are different than say, cancer, insofar as it
deals with the realm of the mind, Szasz and others are disingenuous
when they suggest that mental illness is a myth because the mental and
physical are patently different entities. Much folly can come of going
down such a road – namely, who am I? A mind or brain that types these
letters on this page? This is a solipsist fallacy that never ends. There are
indeed many mental illnesses and while the science may leave us
disappointed, the exercise of any scientific exploration is the gathering
of evidence and deducing a conclusion. I think that for “madness” as
Blackstone viewed it, the evidence is sufficient.
Science survives socially by its legitimacy, much like all social
institutions. As such, if the aim of psychiatry is the benefice of people
with mental illnesses, it behooves the discipline to wisely consider how
history will account of it. Mental disorder is a myth because it is
nescient – a term ripe for manipulation and diminutive of science. But
since this term provides a tacit method of expanding its influence as the
arbiters of behavior, I fear it will survive. In many ways, however,
psychiatry cannot be blamed. In attempting to understand the
metaphysical mind, psychiatry is not like physics, chemistry, or even
law. That is, it cannot operate solely in the physical world, since the
ultimate objective is an understanding of the human experience.
Likewise, as a scientific endeavor, it operates in a political world that
vigorously resists evidence that challenges the orthodoxy. Law is an
orthodoxy that demands explanations which conform to its ontological
view, and there are few institutions more powerful than law.
Consequently, psychiatry is left with the dubious task of adapting its
understanding of behavior to a culture and institution that demands

285. See Fingarette, supra note 197, at 443-44.
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acceptance of its ideological framework. Humility, as the founder of
psychiatry Benjamin Rush opined nearly 200 years ago, is the first and
last step in understanding the astonishing operations of the mind.
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